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INTRODUCTION
Although the end of the Cold War did not bring about a consensus
among the major powers on all international issues, it did make consen-
sus possible on many issues heretofore intractable. To the extent that
some of these now tractable issues involve preventive diplomacy, peace-
making, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding,' the new consensus means
that the United Nations will be able to proceed in earnest with its prima-
ry task - bringing about and ensuring peace.2 However, this also means
that the United Nations' workload will increase, as will the importance
of that work. In the future, the number of trouble spots may well exceed
the financial and manpower resources of the United Nations.3 Therefore,
it is important that the existing efforts of the United Nations be studied
and the relevant lessons learned in order to maximize the efficiency of
future operations.
One of the first post-Cold War missions of the United Nations in-
volved peacekeeping and elections administration in Cambodia. Of
particular interest is the fact that the United Nations' involvement in
Cambodia was unprecedented in its breadth and depth.4 Although the
United Nations has frequently observed and sometimes administered
1. See BOUTROS BouTRos-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY,
PEACEMAKING, AND PEACEKEEPING (1992), for definitions of these terms.
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 1.
3. The United Nations is already having trouble raising funds. In 1993, member states
were some $1.3 billion in arrears in peacekeeping payments. Julia Preston, Members of U.N.
Failing to Pay Up for Peace Keeping: As Global Missions Multiply, U.S. and Others With-
hold Funds, WASH. PosT, June 27, 1993, at A25.
4. Before the Cambodia mission was approved, the U.N. mission that was next largest in
terms of scope and intrusiveness was the mission in Namibia. This mission involved the
supervision of the elections held in November, 1989. U.N. personnel conducted activities
ranging from voter registration to the counting of ballots. See Election Supervision: The
United Nations Experience in Namibia and Nicaragua, U.N. Doc. [ST/] DPI/1 105 (1990).
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elections within the context of the decolonization movement, 5 it has only
recently begun to involve itself in elections in independent countries,6
and only then to monitor elections at the invitation of those countries. In
the case of Cambodia, however, the United Nations Transitional Author-
ity in Cambodia (UNTAC) not only observed the elections, it conducted
them as well.7 However, elections were to be only one part of a compre-
hensive solution to the conflict in Cambodia. Each of the other aspects
was equally unique in terms of the breadth of UNTAC's mandate. The
military aspect of the mandate included imposition of a cease-fire,
enforcement of the ban against foreign military aid and advisors, canton-
ment and demobilization of 70% of the armed forces of the factions, and
the consolidation of the remaining forces into one unified national
army.' In the humanitarian arena, UNTAC was responsible for repatriat-
ing over 250,000 Cambodian refugees in Thailand and finding them a
livelihood, guaranteeing that political prisoners were released, and
ensuring human rights in general.9 Of equal importance was the political
aspect of the United Nations' involvement. In order to produce an
atmosphere conducive to free and fair elections, the United Nations took
over five essential ministries of the State of Cambodia government,
educated citizens about the importance of civic participation, and regis-
tered political parties and eligible voters.'0 Finally, the United Nations
had to ensure that Cambodia would have a secure economic base. This
meant providing short-term aid and guarantees of long-term aid to
5. From 1956 to 1990, the Trusteeship Council of the U.N. monitored or conducted 30
plebiscites, referenda, or elections in non-self governing territories. Enhancing the Effective-
ness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex,
U.N. Doc. A/46/609 Annexes (1991).
6. The Nicaraguan elections in February, 1990, were probably the first elections in an
independent country to be monitored by the U.N. since the half-hearted efforts in Korea after
WWII. In discussing the Nicaraguan government's request for electoral observation, the
Secretary-General noted that there was no precedent for the monitoring of the elections of an
independent country. Letter Dated 6 June 1989 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/44/304 (1989).
Concerning the U.N.'s efforts in Korea, see infra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
7. See Letter dated 30 October 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and
Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Annex 1, Section A, 11, U.N. Doc. A/46/608, S/23177 (1989), 31
I.L.M. 174, 189 [hereinafter Comprehensive Settlement Agreement]. In the terminology of
electoral monitoring, this was a particularly intrusive form of electoral "supervision," which
should be distinguished from electoral "observation." The former encompasses direct involve-
ment in the electoral processes such as "setting the calendar, issuing regulations, wording the
ballot, monitoring polling stations, counting the ballots, and establishing methods for dispute
resolution." Jon M. Ebersole, The United Nations' Response to Requests for Assistance in
Electoral Matters, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 91, 94 (1992).
8. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 2.
9. Id. Annex 4; arts. 21-22; Annex 1, section E.
10. Id, Annex 1, section B; Annex 1, section D; Annex 3.
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encourage the growth in the economy." Finally, it meant keeping the
current elites of the four factions from exploiting Cambodia's natural
resources. 12
To analyze UNTAC's entire involvement would be beyond the
scope of this paper and would be a more fitting subject for a book.
Instead, this paper will analyze whether or not the elections were in fact
free and fair. 3 This is a suitable subject on which to focus because the
success of the elections will determine, to a great extent, the success of
the mission as a whole. Much of the mission was centered on the elec-
tions and creating a "peaceful and neutral environment" to ensure the
freeness and fairness of the elections. Thus, if practical constraints do
not allow us to study the mission in its entirety, the elections are one
aspect of the mission that is as good as or better than any other to study.
In addition, the elections, as a discrete and finite event, are more easily
analyzed than those parts of the mission dedicated to democracy build-
ing, economic reconstruction, or peacekeeping. UNTAC's success or
lack thereof at the latter long-term tasks will not be susceptible to
analysis for quite some time.
Part II of this paper will chart the historical background of the
process that led up to the cease-fire and elections agreement. Part III
will study various international instruments which guarantee the right to
free and fair elections in order to determine the contours of the right as
it exists today. In Part IV, this paper will look at the existing academic
literature to give a more complete understanding of the requirements for
a free and fair election. Part V of the paper will apply these standards to
the elections in Cambodia and conclude that they were, in fact, free and
fair. Part VI will present the lessons of the Cambodian elections. First, it
will discuss how the Cambodia mission has changed our understanding
of the criteria for determining whether the United Nations should in-
volve itself in the elections of an independent country. It will also
present the lessons of the Cambodia mission with respect to the way
electoral missions should be conducted.
11. See Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transi-
tional Authority in Cambodia, U.N. SCOR, at 21, U.N. Doc. S/25719 (1993) [hereinafter
Fourth Progress Report].
12. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
13. The term "free and fair" is a term of art used in international law to mean that the
results of an election adequately represent the will of the people of a country. See infra parts
III, IV.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In order to understand the difficulties involved in the United Na-
tions' task in Cambodia, it is important to explore Cambodia's history.
Although Cambodia was once a great empire in the Indochinese penin-
sula, its collapse began in the 13th century under the weight of Thai and
Vietnamese encroachments, followed by French colonial rule in the mid-
19th century. 4 Prince Norodom Sihanouk is usually credited with nego-
tiating and coercing Cambodia's independence from France in 1953."
Sihanouk then ruled Cambodia, attempting to stay neutral during the
Vietnam War by appeasing both America and the North Vietnamese. 16
Sihanouk's military, however, became disgruntled with his erratic neu-
tralist path. In 1970, while Sihanouk was on a trip to Moscow and
Beijing, General Lon Nol, Sihanouk's prime minister, launched a coup
d'itat 7 Most middle-class, educated and conservative Cambodians were
relieved. The National Assembly, which was controlled by such persons,
voted unanimously to depose Sihanouk and give Lon Nol emergency
powers.' However, Sihanouk had great popularity in the countryside
and his broadcast appeals caused demonstrations and riots throughout
the country. At one point, 40,000 peasants began to march on Phnom
Penh. 9 Sihanouk set up a government in exile in Beijing. At the request
of the Chinese, his government in exile associated itself with the
Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP).' ° While Sihanouk was the face
presented to the world, it was the KCP that did most of the fighting in
Cambodia. The KCP however had another name, the "Khmer Rouge,"'"
and they were controlled by a man named Saloth Sar, whose nom de
guerre was Pol Pot.
14. See FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CAMBODIA: A COUNTRY
STUDY (Russell R. Ross ed., 3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter CAMBODIA]; NAYAN CHANDA, BROTH-
ER ENEMY: THE WAR AFTER THE WAR (1986); THU-HUONG NGUYEN-VO, KHMER-VIET
RELATIONS AND THE THIRD INDOCHINA CONFLICT 1-3 (1992).
15. CHANDA, supra note 14, at 41.
16. CAMBODIA, supra note 14, at 31-35.
17. CHANDA, supra note 14, at 64.
18. CAMBODIA, supra note 14, at 43.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 43-44.
21. The term "Khmer Rouge" has two meanings. It was originally coined by Sihanouk to
refer to the Khmer Issarak and his other leftist opponents. CHANDA, supra note 14, at 41.
This was in juxtaposition to his opponents on the right, the "Khmers Bleu." ld. But the term
also refers to the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP), the organization controlled by Pol
Pot that ruled Cambodia from 1975-1979. IM at 13.
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The irony is that the rightist coup by Lon Nol gave the Khmer
Rouge a second chance.22 Up to that point, the leaders of North Vietnam
and other Communist countries had shown very little actual support for
the KCP. Although some training and weapons had been sent to the
KCP, the Vietnamese generally refrained from doing too much.23
Sihanouk, after all, was fighting the KCP, and the Vietnamese did not
want to offend him and risk losing the use of Cambodian sanctuaries
and the Ho Chi Minh trail. With a rightist government in Phnom Penh,
however, the North Vietnamese realized that they would need a strong
KCP to keep the Lon Nol government from disrupting the war effort in
South Vietnam. Otherwise, they would be squeezed from the west by
Lon Nol and the east by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. Thus, the
North Vietnamese swept out the nationalist forces in northeastern Cam-
bodia, handing over this area to the Khmer Rouge to use as a base.' In
addition, training and military supply began in earnest. The Khmer
Rouge at first used their association with Sihanouk to gain support
among the villagers. Later, when their power was self-sustaining, they
began denigrating Sihanouk.Y In his words of June 1973, "they [the
Khmer Rouge] no longer need me, they will spit me out like a cherry
pit!
' 26
On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge defeated the Lon Nol govern-
ment and entered Phnom Penh.27 The United States had removed itself
from Indochina and the nationalist government in South Vietnam was to
collapse less than two weeks later.28 Thus started a reign of terror in
which at least one million Cambodians, of an estimated population of
six to eight million, were murdered. The Khmer Rouge emptied out all
the cities and declared that it was year zero.29 Disdaining technology and
the decadence of western culture, the Khmer Rouge executed most of
the educated class.30 Even for the non-targeted working class31 life was
22. See generally WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW: KISSINGER, NIXON AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF CAMBODIA (1979).
23. For example, Vietnamese Vice-Foreign Minister Vo Dong Giang, when recounting
the history of the 1960s, did not mention Sihanouk's suppression of the left and noted that
Sihanouk was immensely popular. Id. at 60.
24. CAMBODIA, supra note 14, at 45.
25. CHANDA, supra note 14, at 71.
26. CAMBODIA, supra note 14, at 44.
27. NGUYEN-VO, supra note 14, at 78.
28. Id.
29. CAMBODIA, supra note 14, at 48-49.
30. IU. at 50.
31. The Khmer Rouge classified people as "new people" (urban dwellers) or "old
people" (rural peasants). For "new people," life was often a living hell. They were treated as
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miserable. In the agricultural communes where most Cambodians were
forced to live and work, discipline was strict and punishment was often
times grisly; spying was commonplace.32
The new regime cultivated a hatred of the Vietnamese. The anti-
Vietnamese sentiment quickly led to escalating attacks on Vietnam by
the Khmer Rouge and retaliatory invasions by Vietnam.33 Convinced of
the intractability of the situation by the Khmer Rouge's refusal to nego-
tiate, on December 24, 1978, Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia.34
By January 7, 1979, the Vietnamese, who had the advantage of num-
bers, training, and weapons, were in Phnom Penh.35 The Vietnamese set
up a Cambodian government composed of ex-Khmer Rouge who had
defected for fear of being purged and pro-Vietnamese Cambodian Com-
munists who had stayed in Vietnam when the Khmer Rouge had come
to power.36 The new administration was not strong enough to stand on
its own so there was significant Vietnamese military and civilian sup-
port.37
Meanwhile, several rebel groups had formed on the Thai-Cambodian
border. Each vied for control of the numerous refugee camps that had
sprung up as Cambodian villagers fled or were forced to flee the fight-
ing. The rebel groups fought the Vietnamese, the Vietnamese-installed
Cambodian government, and amongst themselves. The three groups
were the Khmer Rouge, backed by China and Thailand; the National
United Front for An Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative
Cambodia (known by its French acronym FUNCINPEC), the royalist
movement headed by Prince Sihanouk and backed by China and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); 38 and the Kam-
slave laborers, working the longest hours in the most inhospitable places for the smallest rice
rations. CAMBODIA, supra note 14, at 53. The "old people" also faced harsh lives, but not as
bad as the lives of "new people." lI In some areas, especially under more moderate com-
manders along the Vietnamese border, "new people" who were penitent led the same life as
"old people." Id. at 53-54. This ended in 1977-78 when Pol Pot had many Eastern cadres
purged for being traitors (i.e. being moderate) and the remaining moderate cadres fled to
Vietnam. Id at 65-66.
32. I at 50-51.
33. For a detailed description of the pre-war border attacks, some of which were quite
large in scale, see NGUYEN-VO, supra note 14, at 96-102, 104.
34. Id. at 126.
35. CHANDA, supra note 14, at 316-17.
36. CAMBODIA, supra note 14, at 193. Ex-Khmer Rouge members in the new government
included Heng Samrin, Hun Sen, and Chea Sim. Id. at 208--09.
37. CHANDA, supra note 14, at 371-72. The most significant Vietnamese personnel in
Cambodia were the approximately 180,000 Vietnamese troops who stayed in Cambodia
throughout the 1980s. NGuYEN-VO, supra note 14, at 145.
38. ASEAN consists of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Singapore. 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPAEDIA 51 (15th ed. 1992).
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puchean People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), a rightist group
lead by Son Sann and backed by the United States.39 At the urging of
China and ASEAN, the three rebel groups formed a loose and uneasy
coalition known as the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
(CGDK) in order to fight the Vietnamese.' Sihanouk was its nominal
leader.4' The fighting continued throughout the 1980s. Although the
Vietnamese and their Cambodian allies, the State of Cambodia (SOC),
were never able to defeat the rebel forces, they did deal them a crippling
blow in the dry season offensive of 1984-1985.42 This gave the SOC
sufficient breathing room to form a working, stable government. By the
late 1980s, life in Cambodia had achieved some semblance of
"normalcy" (i.e. life in the pre-war and pre-Lon Nol era some twenty
years before).43 One scholar has argued that under the general principles
of the international law of statehood, the SOC was the de facto
government of Cambodia." Nonetheless, lobbying by the United States,
China, and ASEAN guaranteed that the CGDK, with the Khmer Rouge
as its representative, retained Cambodia's seat in the U.N. General
Assembly.45
This situation changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
concomitant cessation of Soviet aid to Vietnam. The Vietnamese had
been economically and politically isolated as a result of their invasion
and occupation of Cambodia. They were largely dependent on approxi-
mately $1 billion per year of Soviet aid.46 When the Soviet Union
collapsed, the Vietnamese were forced to reassess the situation. The
Cambodian conflict as well as a punitive invasion by China in 1979 and
39. CAMBODIA, supra note 14, at 194-95.
40. 1L at 195-201.
41. Id. at 202-03.
42. JONATHAN STROMSETH, TIME ON WHOSE SIDE IN CAMBODIA? 6 (1988).
43. For example, Phnom Penh's population had grown to 500,000 and rice production was
up to 2.5 million tons/year, approaching the numbers for the late 1960s. GARY KLINTWORTH,
VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-89 (1989) [hereinafter
VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION].
44. d at 85-102.
45. See id. at 8-9; CAMBODIA, supra note 14, at 223. In 1979, the vote in the U.N.
General Assembly calling for an unconditional withdrawal of Vietnamese troops was 91 to
21, with 29 abstaining. Id. The situation was little changed in 1988, when 122 nations voted
in favor of the resolution and 19 voted against, with thirteen abstentions. VIETNAM'S INTER-
VENTION, supra note 43, at 9. It should be noted however, that the U.N.'s view of the Khmer
Rouge did slowly change as the evidence of its genocidal atrocities emerged. By 1988,
resolutions were being drafted that were thinly veiled denouncements of the Khmer Rouge.
Such resolutions often called for "the non-return of the universally condemned policies and
practices of a recent past . I... "d
46. For a more detailed analysis, see VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION, supra note 43, at
125-28.
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mismanagement of the economy had put Vietnam in terrible economic
condition.47 Forced to deal with the reality of the changes in the world
geopolitical order, they gradually withdrew their armed forces from
Cambodia. The last withdrawals were completed in 1989." To the
surprise of many, the SOC did not collapse and fought effectively
against the rebels. Apparently, the decade of Vietnamese support had
given them the time to create a functioning government.
Throughout most of the 1980s, the United Nations held periodic
conferences on Cambodia and passed resolutions concerning a peaceful
solution to the Cambodian conflict. However, the SOC, Vietnam, and its
Soviet Bloc allies refused to attend the conferences and ignored the
resolutions because they focused on Vietnam's invasion, rather than the
actions of the Khmer Rouge.49 The conferences and resolutions thus
proved to be ineffective. However, the shifting geopolitical situation in
Southeast Asia brought about a change in heart of the factions. There
were informal meetings between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen in
December 1987 and January 1988.' 0 This was followed by two informal
meetings held in Jakarta on July 25-28, 1988, and February 19-21,
1989.5' Both meetings involved the first face to face contact between the
four Cambodian factions, Vietnam, Laos, and the nations of ASEAN.
This was followed by a conference hosted by France and Indonesia in
Paris. The first Paris conference occurred from July 30 to August 30,
1989.52 Although there was substantial agreement on the use of an
international organization to oversee a peace settlement, guarantees by
foreign countries that they would help secure a lasting peace, and issues
on refugee repatriation and economic reconstruction, the conference
47. For example, rice production had fallen from 18.5 million tons to 17.6 million tons,
unemployment was at 30 percent, and Vietnam faced $7 billion of debts. Id. at 125.
48. William Branigin, Defections Weakening Ranks of Cambodian Rebels, WASH. POST,
September 25, 1993, at A15. Even the U.S. Defense Department acknowledged that Vietnam
had completely withdrawn by October of 1989. GARY KLINTWORTH, CAMBODIA AND PEACE-
KEEPING: 1990, at 2 (Strategic & Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 210, 1990)
[hereinafter PEACEKEEPING: 1990].
49. The conferences stressed Cambodia's sovereignty and right to territorial integrity.
See, e.g., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA, Annex I, at 7, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.109/5, U.N. Sales No. E.81.I.20 (1981). Further, the resolutions generally
called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops as a prerequisite to any solution to the
Cambodian Conflict. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 43/19, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 24,
U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1989).
50. Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodian Settlement Agreements, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 4
(1993).
51. Id. at 4-5.
52. Carol Umhoefer, United Nations: Towards A U.N.-Sponsored Cambodian Solution,
32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 275, 276 (1991).
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adjourned without any substantial result because the factions could not
agree on a power-sharing scheme.53 The second Paris conference started
in the summer of 1991 and worked from a "Framework Document"
54
created by the United Nations Security Council. On October, 23, 1991,
the rebels and the government, under pressure from their various spon-
sors, signed the Paris Agreements.55 The Agreements consisted of four
parts: the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia; the Agree-
ment on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Con-.
flict; the Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territo-
rial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambo-
dia; and the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of
Cambodia.56 The provisions concerning the Cambodian mission were to
be found in the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of
the Cambodia Conflict - the cease-fire and demobilization of forces;
free and fair elections under U.N. auspices; U.N. oversight of the gov-
ernment functions to ensure a neutral political environment; repatriation
of refugees, human rights, clearing of minefields and reconstruction aid;
U.N. verification of the Vietnamese withdrawal; termination of foreign
military assistance; establishment of the Supreme National Council
(SNC) composed of equal members of the four major Cambodian parties
to be the receptacle of Cambodian sovereignty pending the elections;57
protection of human rights; guarantee of the independence, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity for Cambodia; the neutralization of Cambodia;
and the creation of a large U.N. force.58 Under the Agreement, UNTAC
was to be responsible for verifying the withdrawal of Vietnamese
troops; monitoring the cease-fire; administering the cantonment, disar-
mament, and demobilization of forces; ensuring the cessation of outside
53. Id.
54. Statement of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United
Nations on Cambodia, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/45/472-S/21689
(1990).
55. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7 at 5, 31 I.L.M. at 182; Andrew
Bell & Nick Cumming-Bruce, Historic Deal to End War in Cambodia, THE GUARDIAN,
October 24, 1991, at 12. The parties to the Paris'Agreement are the four Cambodian factions,
the states of ASEAN, the Permanent Five members of the Security Council, Australia,
Canada, India, Japan, Laos, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia (as representative for the non-aligned
movement). Id.
56. The two agreements have treaty status. Ratner, supra note 50, at 8.
57. This was a rather unique step to breaking the deadlock concerning powersharing. It
was foreshadowed by Security Council Resolution 668 of September 1990, which called it the
"unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period,
the independence, national sovereignty and unity of Cambodia is embodied[.]" S.C. Res. 668,
U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2941st mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/668 (1990).
58. See Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7.
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assistance along Cambodia's land and sea frontiers; interacting with
neighboring governments regarding the settlement; and contributing to
mine-clearing operations. 9
The first U.N. personnel began arriving the next month under the
authority of Resolution 717 ( 19 9 1).60 Eventually, the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), as the mission was
called, consisted of 22,000 soldiers and civil administrators. 6 It is
estimated that the mission will cost between $1.5 to $2.0 billion, and
another $880 million has been pledged in economic aid.62
The mission, however, was not a complete success. The Khmer
Rouge refused to put down their weapons and their troops did not show
up for cantonment. They also refused to participate in the elections and
actively attempted to sabotage them. Despite the failure of the military
aspect of the mission, the elections themselves were hailed as a success.
From May 23-28, 1993, the United Nations held elections with few
hitches and little interference. 63 The turnout was high, approximately
96% of all eligible voters registered' and more than four million people
or 89.04% of the registered voters went to the polling stations. 65
FUNCINPEC, the royalist party, won a plurality of the seats, 58 out of
120 seats (45.47% or 1.8 million votes), while the Cambodian People's
Party (CPP), the party of the SOC, came in second with 51 seats
(38.22% or 1.53 million votes).66 The KPNLF-affiliated Buddhist Liberal
59. Id Annex 1 at 19.
60. S.C. Res. 717, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3014th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RESI717 (1991).
The Security Council passed this resolution on October 16, 1991, before the signing. By it,
the Security Council decided "to establish, under its authority, a United Nations Advance
Mission in Cambodia [(UNAMIC)] immediately after the signing of the agreements . . . with
members of the mission to be sent to Cambodia immediately after the signing. Id.
61. William Branigin, U.N. Ends Cambodian Operation, Mission Successful Despite
Flaws, WASH. POST, September 27, 1993, at A12. The Security Council later approved the
signing of the Paris Agreements and authorized the appointing of a Special Representative of
the U.N. Secretary-General and UNTAC. Resolution 718, S.C. Res. 718, U.N. SCOR, 46th
Sess., 3015th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RESI718 (1991).
62. The financial situation of the mission is unclear. Commentators have estimated that
the mission will cost between $1.5-$2.0 billion, but it is unlikely that a comprehensive and
accurate accounting will be done soon. Thomas W. Lippman, Aid is Out if Khmer Rouge is
In, U.S. Tells Cambodia, WASH. POST, July 19, 1993, at A9; William Branigin, Cambodia
Moves to Return Sihanouk to His Throne, Elected Leaders Said to Form Consensus on
Monarchy, WASH. POST, August 26, 1993, at A18; U.N. Confirms Dates for Cambodia
Pullout, L.A. TIMES, August 28, 1993, at 11.
63. Thailand 'Recognises' UNTAC's Poll Results, BANGKOK POST, June 12, 1993, at 6.
64. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 21.
65. Lindsay Murdoch, The Ultimate Bad Loser, THE AGE (Melbourne), June 12, 1993, at
14; U.N. Says Elections Were "Free and Fair", AGENCE EUROPE, June 2, 1993, available in
NEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
66. U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO, CAMBODIA ELECTION RESULTS, at 2, U.N. Doc.
ST/DPI/1389 (1993) (hereinafter CAMBODIA ELECTION RESULTS].
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Democratic Party (BLDP) came in third with 10 seats (3.81% or
152,764 votes) and Molinaka, a royalist splinter party, received the
remaining seat.67 Although the SOC and the CPP at first refused to
abide by the results of the elections, all the parties eventually reached a
compromise power-sharing arrangement. Prince Ranariddh, head of
FUNCINPEC and a son of Prince Sihanouk, became the First Prime
Minister while Hun Sen, head of the SOC, became second prime minis-
ter.6 Son Sann, leader of the KPNLF, was elected the Speaker of the
Assembly. 69 The royalists and the CPP agreed to share power over the
important interior and defense ministries.70 The elected representatives
drafted a new constitution, which was ratified on September 25, 1993,
and then convened itself as the National Assembly.71 In an interesting
twist, the monarchy was reinstituted with Sihanouk as king. Sihanouk
was given veto powers over judicial and Cabinet appointments and
military decisions. 72 The Assembly also decided to vest Sihanouk with
"full and special powers ... as chief of state in order that he may save
our nation. 73 Sihanouk then declared that henceforth Cambodia would
"be a de facto liberal democracy with a parliamentary regime."
74
The first United Nations troops started leaving on August 2, 199375
and the last left on November 15, 1993.76 In July and August, the
Khmer Rouge, recognizing the success of the elections, attempted to
negotiate a role for themselves in the new government. To this end, they
67. Id.
68. Lindsay Murdoch, New Deal on Cambodian PM., THE AGE (Melbourne), September
18, 1993, at 9.
69. Philip Shenon, Rival Parties In Cambodia Agree to Form a Coalition Government,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 1993, at A10.
70. Cambodian Agreement, WASH. POST, June 21, 1993, at A13. In addition,
FUNCINPEC took over the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance while the CPP took
control of the Ministry of Information. Id.
71. Sihanouk Again Becomes King and Picks Government, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993,
at A3.
72. Lindsay Murdoch, Sihanouk Cancer News Shakes Cambodian Plan, THE AGE
(Melbourne), Sept. 21, 1993, at 9. In fact, Sihanouk is the supreme military commander in
Cambodia. Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodia Puts Final Touches on New Regime, THE AGE
(Melbourne), September 16, 1993, at 12.
73. Philip Shenon, New Assembly Gives Prince Sihanouk Broad Powers, N.Y TIMES,
June 15, 1993, at A3; Sihanouk Proclaimed New Head of State, WASH. POST, June 15, 1993,
at A16.
74. Khmers to Share Interim Power, BANGKOK POST, June 17, 1993, at 1.
75. Peacekeeping Troops Have Started Their Withdrawal and Now Cambodia is Ponder-
ing Its Future, BANGKOK POST, August 10, 1993, at 3; U.N. Confirms Dates for Cambodia
Pullout, supra note 62.
76. Military Troops to End U.N. Mission in Cambodia, Japan Economic Newswire, Nov.
15, 1993, available in NEXIS, World Library, Jen File.
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commenced a campaign of attacks throughout the country," but were re-
pulsed by the new government, renamed the Royal Government of
Cambodia (RGC). Although the RGC at first considered a role for the
Khmer Rouge, it eventually refused to negotiate until the Khmer Rouge
surrendered themselves and their territory.78
II. INSTRUMENTS GUARANTEEING PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS
Although a discussion of whether free and fair elections have be-
come a human right is beyond the scope of this paper,79 it is useful to
note the various instruments upon which such a right would be based.
Such agreements among nations will help us shape the contours of what
constitutes a free and fair election.
A. United Nations Instruments
The United Nations Charter mentions self-determination in four
places. Article 1(2) mentions that one of the purposes of the United
Nations is to "develop friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of... self-determination of peoples[.]"" Self-determi-
nation is also mentioned in Article 55 in connection with international
77. UNTAC Pulls Out While Khmer Rouge Attacks Become Routine, VIETNAM INVEST-
MENT REV., August 9, 1993.
78. See Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodia's Rulers Heal Rift Over Powers, THE AGE (Mel-
bourne), September 17, 1993, at 8. ("Prince Ranariddh declared today that the Khmer Rouge,
the ultra-Maoist faction that boycotted the elections, would be given no political power in the
Government and rejected the group's latest request for a 15 percent share of control over
ministries.") In fact, the new Constitution requires that all ministers and vice-ministers be
selected from parties with representation in the National Assembly, excluding the Khmer
Rouge from all ministerial posts. Why Khmer Rouge is a Deal Breaker, L.A. TIMES, Septem-
ber 26, 1993, at M4. Later, Prince Ranariddh stated, "The position of the Royal Government
of Cambodia in this regard [negotiating a role for the Khmer Rouge] is perfectly clear. We
are ready to welcome the Khmer Rouge group within the Royal Army and the Royal Govern-
ment of Cambodia as advisers. But we demand, in return, that the Khmer Rouge group
assumes the same responsibilities of the three other former parties which signed the Paris
agreements." Fauziah Ismail, Cambodia Seeks Help in Maintaining Peace, BUSINESS TIMES
(Malaysia), October 6, 1993, at P18. However, the Khmer Rouge have refused to lay down
their arms and cede their territory to the new government as required.
79. For more on this topic, see, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Demo-
cratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and
Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990) (discussing
the view that a participatory right under international law is in the process of forming). For an
opposing view, see Thomas Carothers, Empirical Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of
Democracy in International Law, 86 AM. SocY, INT'L L. PRoc. 261 (1992) (arguing that the
settled quality of the norm is overstated, especially as applied to the eastern hemisphere,
where the strides in democracy have not been as great as those in the western hemisphere).
80. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 2.
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economic and social cooperation." Finally, the charter mentions self-
government in Articles 73(b) and 76(b), mentioning it as an eventual
goal for non-self governing and trust territories.82 However, the defini-
tion of self-determination in the charter is not clear. Within the context
of Articles 73(b) and 76(b), the term has been used in practice to mean
the right of individuals to vote in free and fair elections. Examples of
this include U.N.-monitored elections in West Irian in 1969, the Mariana
Islands District in 1975, and Namibia in 1989.3 However, with respect
to articles 2(7) and 55," there is an ongoing debate whether self-deter-
mination means external self-determination (i.e. the right to decide what
nation you belong to, relevant for those under colonial rule) or internal
self-determination (i.e. the right to determine your leaders and form of
government). 85 For this reason, the sending of election observer missions
to independent nations is a relatively recent development. Before
UNTAC arrived in Cambodia, missions to Haiti and Nicaragua in 1990
were the only instances of United Nations electoral involvement in
independent countries.8 6 The Secretary-General was forced to rationalize
those actions by stating that the nations in question had invited the U.N.
to observe the elections."
81. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
82. Id art. 73, cl. b; Id art. 76, cl. b.
83. See David Padilla & Elizabeth Houppert, International Election Observing: Enhancing
the Principle of Free and Fair Elections, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 73, 95-103 (1993) (discussing
the Mariana Islands District and Namibian elections); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political
Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539, 573-79 (1992) (discussing West
Irian and Namibian election).
84. There are also a number of resolutions which mention the right to self-determination.
These include Resolution 421D, G.A. Res. 421, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 43,
U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950); Resolution 1514, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); Resolution 2625, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 26th
Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). However, each is also susceptible to
differing interpretations of the right to "self-determination." For example, Resolution 1514
specifically calls for an end to colonialism. Resolution 1514, supra.
85. For a more in-depth discussion of this subject, see Mechelle Evans & Darilyn T. Olidge,
What Can the Past Teach the Future? Lessons from Internationally Supervised Self-Determina-
tion Elections 1920-1990, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1711, 1721-27 (1992). General
Assembly resolutions on this issue have failed to shed any light on this issue. Compare G.A.
Res. 150, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/45/150 (1991) ("determining the will of the
people requires an electoral process") with G.A. Res. 151, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/151 (1991) ("any extraneous activities that attempt, directly or indirectly, to interfere
in the free development of national electoral processes ... violate the spirit and letter of the
principles established in the Charter"); G.A. Res. 137, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/137 (1992) (successor to Resolution 45/150) with G.A. Res. 130, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/130 (1992) (successor to Resolution 45/151).
86. There were electoral missions sent to South Korea after World War II, but that
occurred due to the extraordinary needs of the time. See infra notes 280-83 and accompany-
ing text.
87. However, the U.N. electoral observers in Korea were not invited. David Stoelting,
The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 371,
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In contrast to the charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 48-0-8, creates a
much less ambiguous participatory right, declaring in Article 21(1) that
"[e]veryone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives. 8 Article 21(3) states
the particulars. "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority
of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 8 9 Although
the Declaration was initially "a common standard of achievement" and
is technically nonbinding, there is a strong argument that it is now part
of customary international law.90
Finally, there is the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, both of which have identical provisions stating that all peoples
have the right of self-determination. 91 The Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal rights explicitly requires that all citizens have the right, on equal
terms, to take part in their government directly or through representa-
tives and to vote and be elected in genuine elections, with universal and
equal suffrage and by secret ballot.92 Further, there is a guarantee that
the elections must express the free will of the electors. 93 Most important-
ly, these rights cannot be constrained by unreasonable restrictions or on
the basis of "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
B. Regional Organization Instruments
The instruments of regional organizations have similar provisions.
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948)
states that individuals have the right to participate in representative
375-77 (1992). There was no U.N. monitoring of elections in independent countries from
1952 to 1990. Id. at 377 n.29.
88. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
183d mtg. at 71, 75, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
89. ld at art. 21, para. 3.
90. See Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, supra note
79, at 867-68.
91. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, para. 1,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter Covenant on Civil]; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, para. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M.
360 [hereinafter Covenant on Economic].
92. Covenant on Civil, supra note 91, at art. 25.
93. Id.
94. Id. at arts. 2, 25.
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government, including the right to participate in elections that are
"honest, periodic and free."9 The American Convention on Human
Rights (1969) grants similar rights to those in the two international
covenants above; such rights are to be restricted only on the basis of
age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental capac-
ity, or criminal record.96 The Inter-American Commission has defined
the term "'genuine' election" to mean one occurring in the context of "a
legal and institutional structure conducive to election results that reflect
the will of the voters." 97
Article 3 of the First Protocol of the Council of Europe Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states
that members should undertake "to hold free elections at reasonable
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legisla-
ture." 98 More importantly, the Copenhagen Document, adopted by the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on June 29, 1990,
has explicit requirements: each state must hold free elections at reason-
able intervals, all seats in at least one chamber of the legislature must be
freely contested, and there must be respect for the establishment of
political parties and campaigning." And, importantly for our discussion,
it authorizes the observation of national election proceedings.'0°
The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights states that
"[e]very citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the govern-
ment of his country, either directly or through freely chosen represen-
tatives in accordance with the provisions of the law."'0 ' However, the
charter is vitiated by its lack of three vital provisions. First, there is no
95. Res. XXX, app. XX, Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American
States 38, 42 (Pan American Union 1948), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. at Supp. 133, 136
(1949).
96. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 23, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
36 O.A.S.T.S. 8, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. A/16 (1970).
97. O.A.S. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Panama at 47, OEA/Ser.LJV/II.76, Doc. 16, rev. 2 (1989).
98. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, entered into force May 18, 1954, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, 264. Although this may seem
to be rather restrictive, e.g. it does not define specific requirements and does not seem to give
standing to individuals, European tribunals have tended to give it great punch by interpreting
it along the historical experience of European countries and have interpreted it as giving
individuals standing. Fox, supra note 83, at 561-62.
99. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension,
June 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1310.
100. Id.
101. Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, opened for signature June 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58, 61, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 109, 112
(Gino J. Naldi ed., 1992).
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mention of elections, so a country is free to choose a method of leader-
selection so long as it can rationalize that the people are participating.
Second, there is no mention that the will of the people must be imple-
mented. Finally, the ending clause - "in accordance with the provisions
of law" - seems to call for nations to do no more than what they are
currently doing.
III. CRITERIA OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
Although the instruments described above speak of "authentic" and
"genuine" elections, most only give a partial list of what is necessary to
achieve such elections. In order to create a more robust definition, it
will be necessary to look to other sources. The first place to look would
be the Paris Agreements. Article 12 of the Comprehensive Agreement
states that "[t]he Cambodian people shall have the right to determine
their own political future through the free and fair election of a constitu-
ent assembly .... This election will be held under United Nations
auspices in a neutral political environment with full respect for the
national sovereignty of Cambodia."''  The Agreement later lists those
tasks UNTAC must complete in order to bring about a "neutral political
environment." These include creating a code of conduct prohibiting
coercion or financial inducement to influence voter preference; suspend-
ing existing laws inconsistent with a neutral political environment;
implementing a voter education program; carrying out comprehensive
voter registration and drawing up voter lists; registering political parties
and candidates; insuring fair access to the media; monitoring activities
during the elections, campaign, and balloting periods; overseeing the
polling "to ensure that registered voters have the opportunity to vote;"
coordinating the election monitoring of foreign observers; counting the
votes; and investigating any complaints.10 3 Further, Annex 3 of the
Agreement lists some specific requirements of the elections: a hybrid
electoral system; equal opportunity for all Cambodians to participate;
adherence to the code of conduct; voting by secret ballot; guarantees of
freedom of speech, assembly, and movement; and fair access to the
media. 4 Most importantly, the Special Representative to the Secretary-
General in charge of UNTAC told the SNC before the elections that he
believed the freeness and fairness of the elections would depend upon
three critical factors: 1) the extent to which the campaign and elections
102. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 12.
103. Id at Annex 1, sec. D, para. 3(a)-(k).
104. Id at Annex 3.
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were marred by violence, harassment, and intimidation; 2) the extent to
which the SOC, which controlled the government apparatus, conveyed
an unfair advantage to the CPP; and 3) the technical conduct of the
voting itself.'05
Larry Garber, an international elections observer with a great
amount of experience,0 6 has written a book on behalf of the Interna-
tional Human Rights Group detailing guidelines for a free and fair
election."° He notes that to meet the minimal conditions to be free and
fair, an election must have
no unreasonable limitations placed on a citizen's ability to partici-
pate in the political process, including the right to a secret vote and
the right to be elected to office; and respect for the rights of free-
dom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of assem-
bly for a period adequate to allow political organizing and cam-
paigning and to inform citizens about the candidates and issues."
In addition, he notes "[flor a free and fair election, it is also necessary
that the integrity of the balloting process be respected, including con-
sideration whether the candidate or party that receives the proportion of
the vote prescribed by law is allowed to assume office and power."' 9
However, the guidelines also recommend that the observers look at other
criteria as warranted by the situation in the host country."0
One of the most comprehensive set of criteria was recently put forth
by Professor W. Michael Reisman in conjunction with a lecture at the
Pace University School of Law."' For Professor Reisman, the key
criteria is "whether all contending parties have approximately equal
opportunities to present their cases to a public which, in turn, may make
a free choice."' u2 Taking this, the various instruments described above,
and "[t]he rich body of electoral observation practice" into account,
105. Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Paragraph 6 of Security Council
Resolution 810, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/25784 (1993) [hereinafter Report Pursuant].
106. International Observation of Elections, 84 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 375, 382
(1990) (remarks by Stephen Schneebaum). "There is one thread that runs through virtually
every hotly contested and observed election of the last five years. That thread is that Larry
Garber was there. There is no one alive who has observed more elections from the scientific,
analytic point of view than Larry [Garber]." Id.
107. LARRY GARBER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVING (1984).
108. Id. at 34-35.
109. Id. at 35.
110. Id. at 37.
111. W. Michael Reisman, International Election Observation, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 1
(1992).
112. Id. at 24.
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Professor Reisman posited the following criteria for a free and fair elec-
tion: physical security for all persons during all phases of the electoral
process; a fair and appropriate electoral system; comprehensive voter
registration; open and reasonable candidacy requirements; adequate voter
education and opportunities to campaign freely; access to the media and
fairness in reporting; opportunities for popular participation in cam-
paigning; suppression of any foreign intervention that would tip the
"level playing field;" fair districting and parliamentary procedures;
neutrality of the supervising mechanism; appropriate polling procedures;
correct ballot counting; and good-faith implementation of the results.' 3
While a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Studies at New
York University Law School, Professor Gregory Fox derived a set of
criteria for free and fair elections based on the instruments listed above
and U.N. practice." 4 From his treaty sources, he argued that electoral
systems must have universal and equal suffrage, secret balloting, elec-
tions at reasonable and periodic intervals, and no evidence of discrimi-
nation against voters or candidates." 5 To these requirements, he added
the following criteria taken from the United Nations' practice in the
observation of elections:
1) citizens must have the opportunity to organize and join political
parties, and such parties must be given equal access to the ballot;
2) to the extent the government controls the media, all parties must
have the opportunity to present their views through the media; and
3) the election must be overseen by an independent council or
commission not tied to any party, faction, or individual, but whose
impartiality is ensured both in law and practice.1
6
Later, Professor Fox remarked that the same requirements had been
listed in almost every report from U.N. observer missions and approved
by the General Assembly or the Security Council.". "Individually, these
reports and their unquestioned adoption might mean little, but the repeti-
tion of the same criteria over a thirty-year period suggests that there is
little dissent among U.N. member states over a short list of elements of
electoral fairness."1' 8
113. Ma at 25-48.
114. See Fox, supra note 83.
115. kI at 570.
116. Id. at 590.
117. Speech by Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International
Law, in National Sovereignty Revisited: Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in
International Law, 86 PRoc. ANN. MTG. Am. Soc. INT'L L. 249 (1992).
118. Id. at 252.
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Mechelle Evans and Darilyn T. Olidge, Junior Fellows at the Center
for International Studies at the New York University School of Law,
draw the contours of free and fair elections from the experience of the
United Nations in both decolonization elections and independent state
elections."' They build their foundation on General Assembly Resolu-
tion 742," ° which identifies criteria to judge whether a non-governing
territory has achieved a measure of popular participation. The resolution
requires measures effective enough to ensure the "democratic expression
of the will of the people, party pluralism (i.e. more than one party),
secret ballots, the legal prohibition of actions at odds with democracy, a
choice between candidates of different parties, the absence of 'martial
law' and similar measures at election times.'' 2' In addition, they note
that those territories wishing to achieve the status of free association
with an independent country must meet additional requirements: univer-
sal and equal suffrage and free periodic elections untainted by voter
influence or coercion." Other criteria determined to be necessary as a
result of a specific electoral mission include voter education (Togoland
Plebiscite), non-partisan electoral laws (Cook Islands Plebiscite), inde-
pendent electoral commissions (Cook Islands), uniform and updated
voter rolls (Guinea Plebiscite), and accuracy in distributing and counting
ballots (Guinea).' Finally, the authors draw some additional criteria
from United Nations experience in independent countries, such as com-
plete freedom of organization and mobilization for all political parties,
equal media access, properly drawn electoral rolls, and an electoral
process that is "free and fair at every stage."'" Finally, Evans and
Olidge derive criteria from the philosophical realization that self-deter-
mination requires "freedom of thought, conscience, expression, move-
ment and association[,]" for "[s]elf-determination entails legitimate,
lively dissent and testing at the ballot box with frequent regularity."' 2 5
Another Junior Fellow at the Center of International Studies, David
Stoelting, noted that some requirements for a free and fair election are
standard terms of reference for all United Nations observer missions. 26
These criteria are ensuring political parties' equality, monitoring free-
119. See Evans & Olidge, supra note 85.
120. G.A. Res. 742, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 17 at 21, U.N. Doc. A/2630
(1953).
121. Evans & Olidge, supra note 85, at 1736-37.
122. Id. at 1737.
123. Id. at 1738.
124. Id.
125. Id at 1713-14.
126. See Stoelting, supra note 87.
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dom of movement and speech, observing the registration process and
reporting back to the Secretary-General. 27
Finally, David Padilla and Elizabeth Houppert of the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights note several lessons derived from U.N.
experience in election monitoring and supervising." One important and
recurring aspect of the United Nations missions is the need for voter
education. 2 9 Another common component is the attempt to create a
"neutral environment."' 130 The final point they note is the importance of
an appropriate administration of the vote, which takes into account the
environment.13'
It is interesting to note that the these criteria from academics, prac-
titioners and students are surprisingly similar. There does seem to be a
norm developing on this subject. However, for the purposes of this
paper, we will use Professor Reisman's requirements as they are the
most comprehensive (both in the number of criteria and in the broadness
of each criterion) and encompass the requirements of all the others,
including those of the Cambodian Agreements. In addition to scrutiniz-
ing the criteria, it will also be necessary to take a more global view of
the situation. As a final check, we will need to make an imprecise, but
nonetheless useful, estimation as to whether the will of the Cambodian
people was truly reflected in the election results. Finally, it should be
noted that in a country such as Cambodia, where the prospects for
democracy appear bleak, it is important that we study, as closely as pos-
sible, each criterion. Problems in the electoral process considered minor




In order for elections to be free and fair, all persons must feel safe
to act freely and follow their consciences at every stage of the electoral
127. l at 394.
128. Padilla & Houppert, supra note 83.
129. Id at 103.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. However, the argument goes both ways. One could reasonably argue that the
imperfect conditions in Cambodia make elections that are "substantially" free and fair a cause
for celebration. "[G]iven Cambodia's tragic history, it would probably be neither realistic nor
fair to hold it to prevailing standards in stable democratic countries." Fourth Progress Report,
supra note 11, at par. 140.
1197Summer 1995]
Michigan Journal of International Law
process. It would be farcical to have an election whose balloting proce-
dures were technically free and fair if voters felt significant pressure
once they stepped outside the polling station. For example, the 1987
elections in Haiti were marked by "threats, violence, and killings
throughout the campaign ... with the government making no attempt to
address the crisis."'33 Further violence and killings on election day led to
an eventual cancellation of the vote."3 However, Professor Reisman
cautions that "[flew of the critical elections that get international obser-
vation are free of such violence. But it is clear that, beyond a certain
point, the failure to control such violence chills individual free choice
and contaminates the freedom and fairness of an election as a whole.' 35
Within the context of the recent Cambodia elections, two significant
pressures mitigated against a free and fair election. The first was pres-
sure from the Khmer Rouge not to participate in the elections; the
second was pressure from the SOC to vote for its political party, the
Cambodian People's Party (CPP). As will be seen below, the first,
although more destructive and causing more physical danger, probably
was a less serious threat than the latter.
1. Pressure from the Khmer Rouge
Almost any outside observer would be astonished by the fact that
the Khmer Rouge agreed to sign the Paris Agreements. After all, the
Khmer Rouge were responsible for the most notoriously despicable
regime in Cambodia's history. Why would they agree to free and fair
elections? It was no surprise then when the Khmer Rouge began to
renege on the obligations under the agreements, first by refusing to
show up for cantonment and second and more importantly, by refusing
to participate in and actively sabotaging the implementation of the
elections. The Khmer Rouge attempted to hamper the elections using
two methods, attacking U.N. personnel and intimidating Khmer citizens
from voting.
The main Khmer Rouge targets were the personnel of the UNTAC
contingent. 36 For example, on May 3, 1993, a UNTAC patrol of two
133. Padilla & Houppert, supra note 83, at 113.
134. Id at 113.
135. International Election Observation, supra note 111, at 25.
136. Although the Khmer Rouge did attack and kill non-U.N. personnel, these were for
the most part Vietnamese settlers and SOC personnel. Both groups have always been Khmer
Rouge targets, the former based on ethnic hatred and the latter based on ideological hatred.
Both would have been attacked by the Khmer Rouge in the absence of elections. Therefore,
these targets of the Khmer Rouge's violence will not be dealt with in-depth because analysis
of these attacks goes beyond the scope of the elections.
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vehicles was fired upon by the Khmer Rouge. 37 The next day, the
Khmer Rouge fired upon a camp of Chinese and Polish peacekeepers.1 38
Although these actions did not directly intimidate Khmer citizens, they
did stall the elections. First, the Khmer Rouge created a situation in
which it was difficult to find U.N. personnel willing to conduct elections
by making their jobs dangerous. For example, after the death of a U.N.
district supervisor and his Cambodian assistant, some 60 U.N. volunteers
resigned their posts. 39 Second, it had an indirect intimidation effect on
the voters. Election observers have noted that the mere presence of
electoral officials can give voters a sense of security that an impartial
third party is involved in the electoral process."4 However, when a
Cambodian citizen discovers that the Khmer Rouge can attack and kill
U.N. officials, there is little doubt in his mind that the Khmer Rouge
can do the same to him. -
However, this constant harassment of U.N. officials did not achieve
its goals. One of the reasons was the bravery and dedication of many
U.N. officials. While many UNTAC officials left their posts, many more
did not. For example, although 60 U.N. volunteers resigned when the
district electoral supervisor mentioned above was killed, it should be
noted that this was from a pool of more than 6,000 UNTAC civilian
personnel. 4 In the end, the U.N. was able to find enough electoral
officials, especially the 1,400 necessary for the critical days of the
elections. 42 In addition, UNTAC did move to effectively use its military
arm to provide protection. The military component of UNTAC, not
needed for the defunct cantonment process, escorted voter registration
137. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 41.
138. Report Pursuant, supra note 105, at para. 12. There were other attacks on UNTAC,
although in those instances the assailants were unidentified. However, it would seem that only
the Khmer Rouge would have anything to gain from attacking U.N. peacekeepers. From April
30 to May 11, there were nine incidents of attacks on UNTAC personnel. Fourth Progress
Report, supra note 11, at para. 41; Report Pursuant, supra note 105, at para. 12. As of May
15, 13 UNTAC personnel had been killed and 52 had been injured as a result of hostile
action. Report Pursuant, supra note 105, at para. 13.
139. Report Pursuant, supra note 105, at para. 10. Although this incident was later
declared to be unrelated to the Khmer Rouge, the mere perception that the attack was part of
an organized Khmer Rouge program of violence caused the panic among U.N. personnel.
140. "Often in remote geographical areas, people may simply not be willing to take the
risks associated with political participation without the assurance that there is somebody
watching and that the eyes that are watching reflect the attention of the rest of the world."
International Observation of Elections, supra note 106, at 376 (remarks by Stephen
Schneebaum).
141. In fact, there were some 465 other district electoral supervisors alone. Fourth
Progress Report supra note 11, at para. 31.
142. Report Pursuant, supra note 105, at para. 5. Of these, 900 were recruited from 44
countries and 130 from the U.N. Secretariat. Id. Only 370 were already in Cambodia with
UNTAC. Id.
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teams, 43 and electoral workers were not allowed to venture alone in
unsecured areas without military escort.'" Further, U.N. civilian person-
nel were stationed with military units at night.' 45 Finally, the bravery of
the Cambodian people cannot be denied. Despite the violence, they
registered and voted in large numbers."
The second prong of the Khmer Rouge attack was to keep Khmer
citizens from voting. First, U.N. personnel were not allowed to register
citizens or soldiers under Khmer Rouge control."4 Second, the Khmer
Rouge confiscated voter registration cards. Third, it forbade those per-
sons under its control from voting. Finally, there was a threat of vio-
lence against the polling stations on the days of the voting.
However, these measures were largely ineffective. The U.N. sent
personnel into Khmer Rouge areas despite constant harassment. In fact,
there was a UNTAC liaison stationed in Pailin, considered the Khmer
Rouge's headquarters area, until April 30, 1993.48 Next, a system was
created whereby those who had lost their registration cards could none-
theless tender their ballots. Such ballots would be counted pending
verification of their authenticity by handwriting and fingerprinting
experts.'49 Most importantly, the Khmer Rouge's prohibition on partici-
pation in the voting was largely ineffective, even among its own sol-
diers. The will of Cambodians and their desire to vote overwhelmed the
Khmer Rouge. Many Khmer Rouge cadres and their families disobeyed
directives from higher levels and cast their ballots. One U.N. election
official told a story of how Khmer Rouge cadres allowed villagers to
vote:
Catherine Pascal is Untac electoral supervisor in the remote
Banteay Srei district. Just before the election, she received a regu-
lar visitor from a Khmer Rouge-controlled village. Villagers had
been given permission by the guerrilla commander to vote. The
commander had advised them to vote for Funcinpec, but warned
Pascal that once they had voted, an attack would be launched on
government soldiers next to the polling site. All 220 registered
voters from the village arrived in two groups, on Sunday and
143. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 6.
144. let at para. 31.
145. Id.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
147. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 38.
148. 1& Even when the liaison was pulled out, negotiations occurred to set up a new
office in nearby Sok Sann. Id.
149. Id. at para. 29.
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Monday. On Wednesday the guerrillas attacked, and were beaten
back. But in the one hour the polling station was open between
shelling and machine-gun attacks, 24 people from another village
voted. 0
Khmer Rouge civilians were likewise seen voting in Poipet in the
Banteay Meanchey province."' Futthermore, the universal desire to vote
made it impossible for the Khmer Rouge to earnestly attack polling
stations. Pat Pring, a Khmer Rouge company commander in Kompot
Thom, stated that his unit had been ordered to shell polling sites to
prevent voting in May. 52 "In some places we did, and some places we
didn't[.]"' 53 The orders were disobeyed, he explained, when unit mem-
bers feared harming their relatives who wanted to vote." Sy Ninh, a
twenty-year veteran of the Khmer Rouge and commander of the much
feared Division 616, was ordered to disrupt Cambodia's elections last
May. 5 "We were given the order, but we didn't do it," he said at a
Cambodian military camp, 16 miles southeast of Phnom Penh. "It was
the people's election. They want peace in the country.' 5 6
Thus, on election day, there were no serious attacks on polling
stations. And what violence there occurred was largely ignored by the
voters. One reporter wrote the story of a lone voting outpost in Khmer
Rouge territory:
Five hundred and nine voters reached the mobile polling station
beyond the village of Angkor Thom last Tuesday, interrupted only
by the twice-daily shelling by the Khmer Rouge, at breakfast and
lunch. Mortars landed within a few hundred yards of the
Bangladeshi Untac battalion guarding the site. The next day 100
more had voted by lunchtime, straggling in from villages to the
north where it is too dangerous to establish polling booths. 17
Giving support to these anecdotes is the high turnout. Almost 90% of
the registered citizens voted. Clearly, the Khmer Rouge pressure to
refrain from voting was not effective.
150. Apichart Rattanavichai, Government Party Likely to Win 3 Seats in Poipet, BANG-
KOK POST, May 29, 1993, at 7.
151. Id.





157. Nick Thorpe, Royalists Take Early Lead in Cambodia Poll, THE OBSERVER (Lon-
don), May 30, 1993, at 12.
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2. Pressure from the SOC
However, just because voter turnout is high does not mean that an
election is free and fair. If voters are not given an actual choice, an
election cannot be legitimate. A major problem was the SOC's use of its
military and police forces to harass and intimidate workers and candi-
dates of the opposition parties, especially FUNCINPEC and the BLDP,
in the months before the campaign.' For example, Prince Ranariddh
blamed the SOC for the murder of 46 FUNCINPEC activists in the run
up to the elections.'59
UNTAC reacted to this coercion to the best of its ability. UNTAC
civilian police were stationed outside the headquarters of those opposi-
tion parties believed to be at particular risk.' 60 At first, this was done on
a twenty-four hour basis, although the guards switched to night duty
later on.' 6' In addition, UNTAC strenuously objected to the SOC. How-
ever, persecution of the wrongdoers was light. For example, within the
SOC Ministry of Defense, there was a commission to investigate inci-
dents of political intimidation and harassment carried out by its SOC
military forces, the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF).' 62 Even
though UNTAC was able to point to instances of harassment and pro-
vide the commission with lists of those responsible, UNTAC concluded
that "the 'ministry' has admitted the guilt of its personnel in only a
small number of cases and punishments [have been] rare."' 163 Efforts at
apprehending those within the civilian or police sectors were equally
unavailing. 6' Although no office with UNTAC guards was ever attacked
and politically motivated violence decreased from December 1992 to
March 1993 following UNTAC action,' 65 the level of violence increased
in mid-March 1993 when the opposition parties began to open offices at
the village and commune level, making the offices too numerous to
protect in many instances.)
158. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at paras. 5, 112.
159. Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodia's Fate Now Rests on the New Leaders From a Bloody
Past, THE AGE (Melbourne), Sept. 25, 1993, at, 8.
160. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 6. Initially, all political headquar-
ters were visited and guarded by UNTAC civilian police, but as the number grew to 600, this
became impossible and prioritization, in collaboration with the parties themselves, became
necessary. Id at para. 80.
161. Id.
162. Id. at para. 65.
163. Id. at para. 65.
164. Id.
165. See id at paras. 7-8, 80.
166. See id at para. 80.
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In the end, UNTAC was hampered by the requirement that it be
completely neutral. This meant not taking more assertive action to stop
the violence. For example, no use of the U.N.'s oversight of Cambodian
governmental powers was exercised. This was true despite the fact that
the U.N. had binding control of the ministries of foreign affairs, national
defense, finance, public security and information "[i]n order to ensure a
neutral political environment."' 67 Other agencies deemed to be capable
of directly influencing the outcome of the elections were also placed
under the "direct supervision or control" of UNTAC.' 1s Most important-
ly, UNTAC had the power to make a binding determination as to "those
civil police necessary to perform law enforcement in Cambodia"'169 and
had the power to supervise or control the civil police and supervise the
courts. 7 ' The Special Representative also had the, power to appoint
"United Nations personnel who [would] have unrestricted access to all
administrative operations and information" into any Cambodian agen-
cy171 and to remove any Cambodian personnel of those administrative
agencies." In addition, an idea to use a special prosecutor and impartial
judges from abroad was never fully implemented. A special prosecutor
was appointed and he did issue warrants for the arrest of CPAF and
SOC officials wanted for political harassment. 73 However, because the
SOC neither cooperated in capturing such individuals nor produced an
independent judiciary to try them, the job of the special prosecutor was
almost impossible. 74 Finally, UNTAC could have imposed sanctions
167. See Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 6 & Annex 1, sec.
B, para. 1. These five areas were considered most important for creating a neutral political
environment. See id.
168. See Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 1, sec. B, para.
2. These included those departments responsible for education, public health, agriculture,
fisheries, energy, transportation and communications. Ratner, supra note 50, at 14. The Special
Representative of the Secretary-General may issue guidance to these agencies, but the guidance
is binding. See Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 1, sec. B, paras.
1, 2. Further, UNTAC could investigate a less-politicized, third class of agencies (e.g., cultural
affairs) and upgrade their supervision as needed. Ratner, supra note 50, at 14.
169. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 1, sec. B, para. 5(a).
170. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 1, sec. B, para. 5(b).
171. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 1, sec. B, para. 4(a).
172. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 1, sec. B, para. 4(b).
173. See Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 111
174. There is little dispute that there does not exist in Cambodia today an independentjudiciary. Noting that only ten law graduates were left in the country after 1979, the various
panelists at a United Nations symposium on human rights in Cambodia all agreed that the
creation of an independent judiciary is fundamental to human rights in Cambodia. The Right
of Peoples to Self-Determination and Its Application to Peoples Under Colonial or Alien
Domination or Foreign Occupation: Situation in Cambodia, Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Human Rights, 49th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 9, at 8-9, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1993/19 (1993).
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against the CPP by withholding aid until the violence abated. For exam-
ple, UNTAC was responsible for $880 million dollars of economic
rehabilitation projects. Another source of economic leverage was the
U.N. plan to raise $146 million to pay the salaries of SOC employees.17 1
However, UNTAC was hampered by the fact that it had to remain
impartial and could not offend the CPP. A move against the CPP would
have benefited FUNCINPEC and the BLDP. Such actions would have
strengthened CPP allegations of impartiality in the wake of the CPP
loss. Moreover, with the Khmer Rouge already out of the process, it
would have been devastating if the SOC and CPP also decided to pull
out of the election process. The Khmer Rouge and the SOC control the
most land and have the strongest military forces in Cambodia. An
election involving only FUNCINPEC and the BLDP would have been a
sham, even if it had been free and fair, especially if the SOC had re-
fused to turn over power afterwards. Furthermore, any move against the
SOC would have raised issues of sovereignty unless clearly allowed
under the Paris Agreements. Additionally, the CPP, the political party,
and the SOC, the government, as is standard in most Communist coun-
tries, were so intertwined that it would have been impossible to punish
one without seeming to punish the other. However, it would be unfair to
punish the government for the wrongs of the political party. Finally, be-
cause the SOC was responsible for governing most of Cambodia, hin-
dering its functioning would have imposed grave risks for the entire
peace and electoral process. Weakening the government would have
risked throwing most of Cambodia into administrative chaos. For exam-
ple, when CPAF troops were not paid on time, they often would degen-
erate into bandit groups. Not only did this lead to more violence and
disorder, but also allowed the Khmer Rouge troops free reign.
Yet, two questions linger. Despite the level of SOC violence against
the opposition parties, did UNTAC nonetheless meet its goal of provid-
ing a free and fair election? Second, despite the constraints, could
UNTAC have used its other options? The central issue in the first ques-
tion is whether the violence was of a level inevitable in elections in
countries where human rights abuses are not uncommon and democracy
is unknown, or whether it was of such a magnitude that it had a chilling
effect on individual choice. It might be helpful, therefore, to compare
past election observations. One good example is that of the elections in
El Salvador in 1991. During the campaign, a candidate in the Marxist
175. Lindsay Murdoch, The Blocks to Peace, THE AGE (Melbourne), June 19, 1992, at
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Nationalist Democratic Union and his wife were killed.176 There were
also complaints about threats and attacks on opposition party mem-
bers.'" Even though the electoral monitors from the Organization of
American States (OAS) believed lack of coercion to be the most impor-
tant aspect of a free and fair election, 78 the observers nonetheless found
that these problems did not delegitimize the process.
179
Although the violence of the SOC was of a greater magnitude and
went largely unpunished, it compares favorably with El Salvador. It
should be pointed out that the violence was not directed at the general
electorate or even general supporters of the opposition parties.8 ° Rather,
the violence was targeted at campaign workers of the opposition parties.
Despite the violence, however, not one opposition party pulled out of
the race. All continued to run their campaigns to the end, and, in the
case of FUNCINPEC, soundly defeated the CPP. Thus, the intended
targets, the opposition parties, were undeterred. The one caveat is that
there is no way of knowing whether the CPP would have garnered
fewer votes and the opposition parties more votes if the campaign of
violence had not occurred. This concern is particularly relevant given
Cambodia's electoral system, which is based on proportional represen-
tation.
3. General Violence
Although the violence against voters and party officials proved not
to hamper the election process, one must look at the general level of
fighting in Cambodia. Despite the agreements made by the four Cam-
bodian factions, the cease-fire was never implemented; nor was UNTAC
able to successfully implement stage two of the cease-fire, involving the
176. Second Report of the Secretary-General on the Electoral Process in El Salvador 2,
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G/CP/INF.3101/91 Add. 1 (Nov. 13, 1991).
177. Id.
178. See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti 10, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.LJV/II.77, doc. 18, rev. 1 (1991); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Panama, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.LJV/II.76, doc. 16, rev. 2 (1989).
179. Padilla & Houppert, supra note 83, at 115. In fact, the El Salvadoran and Cambodi-
an elections bear some significant resemblance. As in Cambodia, the El Salvadoran elections
involved violence and harassment against opposition parties, but no problems at political
rallies. There were charges that government officials were using their positions to benefit their
party (e.g. job transfers of opposition candidates or denying services to opposition parties),
however, there was no significant problem of media access. In addition, the voting day was
quite peaceful. As noted above, the observers, although troubled by the problems in El
Salvador, did not feel they invalidated the election results. Id. at 114-15. For a general
discussion, see id. at 114-50.
180. For example, the rallies of the opposition parties occurred without significant
problems. See infra text accompanying note 234.
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cantonment and disarmament of the factions' forces and the eventual
demobilization of 70% of all troops in Cambodia.
The relevant question, then, is whether the U.N. troops could have
stopped the fighting and whether it made a difference in the elections.
Although the U.N. military contingent was large, it was obviously
nowhere near the size of the armed forces of the Cambodian factions.
Further, many of the Cambodian units were crack troops with over two
decades of fighting experience and knowledge of their own terrain. It
would have been fruitless for the U.N. troops to intervene in the fighting
in order to fulfill a peacemaking goal. Further, U.N. involvement would
show some lack of impartiality. Finally, severe U.N. casualties would
have had detrimental effects on the ability of future peacekeeping mis-
sions to recruit peacekeepers. Thus, greater U.N. involvement would
have been futile.
International political and economic pressure was an equally un-
availing option because the Khmer Rouge were largely immune to
outside pressures. And if the Khmer Rouge refused to stop fighting, it
would have been unfair and useless to call for the other factions to not
fight back. The irony of the peace process was that although the Paris
Agreements required China to stop supplying the Khmer Rouge, it also
freed the Khmer Rouge of any restraining influence the Chinese might
have had. The two grew so distant that the Khmer Rouge even attacked
the compound of a Chinese Engineer Battalion.' 8' The Khmer Rouge
were able to supply themselves mainly through the sale of gems and
lumber from the areas under their control. Although the U.N. and the
SNC placed an embargo on Cambodian gems and lumber, many Thai
businessmen violated the ban, and local officials from the Thai-Cambo-
dian border areas looked the other way.'82 This allowed the Khmer
Rouge to continue reaping its estimated $250 million a year in reve-
nues. 83 It was only belatedly that the embargo and the cessation of
Chinese aid began to have an effect. 8 "
181. Report Pursuant, supra note 105, at para. 12.
182. See Cambodia: The End of the Beginning, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 19, 1993, at 4.
The continued illegal trade is not surprising given the fact that Thai gem-mining companies
have invested $120 million in Khmer Rouge territories. Richard D. Fisher, Averting A Failure
of U.N. Peace Keeping in Cambodia, Memo to President-Elect Clinton (Heritage Foundation,
Washington, D.C.), December 15, 1992, at 1.
183. Ben Kiernan, Let Cambodians Have Justice at Last, N.Y. TIMES, October 29, 1993,
at A28.
184. Three mid-level officers who defected in late June 1993, told similar stories of low
morale, especially in the southwest, due to a scarcity of food, medicine and money. Khmer
Rouge Talk Peace But Keep Shooting, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 17, 1993, at 1. Defectors from
the northwest told similar stories about supplies not reaching units that strayed too far from
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Nonetheless, the continued fighting did not seem to dampen the
ardor of the Cambodian people or the commitment of UNTAC. For
example, although the killing of a voter in Kompong Chain province by
shelling on the first day caused the polling station there to close down,
it opened up later.8 ' Two polling stations were attacked by armed men,
but voting resumed shortly after the attacks. 86 In fact, while some
polling stations closed temporarily due to the fighting, many others did
not close at all. 187 Thus, it seems that although the continued fighting
may have added to the misery of the Cambodian people, large numbers
of them nonetheless came out to vote.
B. Fair and Appropriate Electoral System
One of the biggest sources of contention during the Paris Agree-
ments negotiations was the system to employ to translate election results
into political power. The SOC insisted on a winner-take-all system
based on districts. It expected that its existing control structure, which
covered large areas of Cambodia, would bring about majorities in its
favor in most of the districts. The opposition parties called for propor-
tional representation to ensure that the percentage of votes they received
(expected to be less than a majority) would be fairly represented in the
Assembly. However, since Cambodia had never had truly free and fair
elections before, its historical customs were of no use. Further, because
it was already an independent country, to look to the electoral methods
of its ex-colonial master, France, would have been an insult to its sover-
eignty.
Both methods are commonly used throughout the world. The win-
ner-take-all system involves dividing the country into electoral districts
corresponding to one seat on the legislature, individual candidates
running for office, citizens placing their vote for individuals rather than
parties, and the winner of the majority (sometimes of the plurality) of
the votes in the district taking the seat. Such a system has the tendency
to over-represent the larger parties. In Great Britain there are only three
significant parties and in America, only two. Although this ensures that
there is less deadlock in the legislative process, small parties are almost
the main logistical bases in Thailand. Lindsay Murdoch, Rebel Gives Up Khmer Rouge Fight,
THE AGE (Melbourne), Sept. 17, 1993, at 28. Some Khmer Rouge defectors said that they
surrendered because they were simply too hungry to continue fighting. Charles P. Wallace,
Cambodia Struggles Over What to Do With Its Armies, L.A. TiMEs, July 6, 1993, at H2.
185. Report of the Secretary-General on the Conduct and Results of the Elections in
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always under-represented. For example, the third party in Great Britain,
the Liberal Party, received 13.8% of the vote and only 1.7% of the seats
in the House of Commons election of May, 1979.8' The system, despite
its shortcomings, has been approved by both the European Commission
and European Court of Human Rights, which found that the exclusion
of smaller parties is not discriminatory, but rather a valid use of discre-
tion by the government. 89
Proportional representation involves political parties drawing up lists
of candidates. Voters vote for parties, and then the seats in the legisla-
ture are apportioned approximately along the lines of the percentage of
votes achieved by each party. If a party receives twenty seats, the first
twenty candidates on its list become legislators. Although the system is
more fair in that even minority views are given proportional representa-
tion in the legislature, it tends to cause deadlocks, especially if no party
has a majority and every one of the multitude of parties has a different
agenda. Alternatively, small parties may be given inordinate power
when they represent the swing vote. In Israel, neither of the two major
parties, Labor and Likud, can gain a majority in the Knesset. They need
the support of the smaller parties to get a majority, and this often means
that significant concessions must be given to the smaller parties who are
willing to help them build a majority."l
The Cambodian candidates eventually resolved the conflict through
a compromise. The method would be a hybrid of the two systems.
Voting would occur by province, but each province would be allotted a
certain number of seats which would be apportioned by proportional
representation of the votes within the province.'91 This system is not
unique and was successfully used by Nicaragua in its elections in
1990." This seemed to be a particularly good solution for several
reasons. First, the compromise was acceptable to all parties, allowing the
188. Liberal Party v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8765n9, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 211, 213 (1980).
189. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7140n5, 7 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 95,
96-97 (1976); Liberal Party v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at
224-25 (1980). The Court affirmed this view in Mathieu-Mohin v. Belgium, 113 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 23-24 (1987).
190. See, e.g., John Kifner, Israel's Parliament Backs PLO. Accord, 61 to 50, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 24, 1993, at Al (noting that Shas party, which holds six seats in the 120-
member parliament, is crucial in forming a coalition and therefore receives key patronage
posts for its support).
191. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 3, para. 2.
192. See Fifth Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Observer Mission
to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 34, at 5,
U.N. Doc. A/44/927 (1990). However, the president was elected by a simple majority of all
the votes. Id. at 9.
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fragile negotiation process to continue. Further, it adequately balances
equity issues with practical concerns. Smaller parties have an opportuni-
ty to be represented, while ensuring that the legislature does not become
bogged down with the goals of twenty separate political parties. Finally,
the process constitutes a free and fair way to choose legislators because
it is based on two legitimate methods of representative selection. There
were few objections from citizens or any of the smaller parties not
signatories to the agreement.1 93
C. Comprehensive Voter Registration Procedure
This aspect of the electoral process, more so than any other, repre-
sents a success for the United Nations. Some 96% of the eligible voters
were registered. However, even if a high percentage of those eligible to
vote are registered, this will mean nothing if substantial numbers of
persons are unreasonably excluded from the numbers of those eligible to
vote. Because of a last minute change in registration qualifications,
some doubt was created as to the freeness and fairness of the elections.
The registration process went extremely well, as evidenced by the
registration of almost 96% of the eligible population. And the registra-
tion of voters was not only a quantitative success, but a qualitative one
as well. Representatives of the political parties were present at the
registration of voters and challenged less than 1% of those registered,
with no challenge being substantiated by evidence." 94 This is especially
significant given the obstacles that the UNTAC faced. Many parts of
Cambodia are difficult to reach and sparsely populated. The rainy winter
season makes travel difficult for a significant part of the year. In addi-
tion, the Khmer Rouge attempted to hinder all U.N. efforts to contact
the population under its control.
There are several points to note regarding the U.N.'s success. Be-
sides administrative efficiency, the major reason for the success was that
UNTAC gave itself enough time. The United Nations Advance Mission
in Cambodia (UNAMIC) arrived in November of 1991, about a year and
193. To be fair, the method, negotiated by the four major factions, actually represents a
compromise for them alone. That is, it confers an advantage only to those parties with
substantial support in a province. For smaller parties with little support (e.g., 1% or 2% of the
vote) spread out over every part of the nation, it is little better than the winner-take-all
system. Proportional representation, on the other hand, would have given most of these small
parties between one to three seats in the 120-seat Assembly. Even though this may impugn
the moral legitimacy of the electoral system, it does not make it less free and fair because the
system was not imposed by the government in order to favor its own party at the expense of
all other opposition parties, and it is difficult to imagine that an election would have taken
place at all if the parties had not been able to compromise on this issue.
194. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 25.
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a half before the elections.' 95 This gave the electoral authority enough
time to determine how to go about registering the populace and imple-
menting the registration plan. This also gave UNTAC enough time to
hire and train 50,000 Cambodians as electoral workers. 96 The registra-
tion started on October 5, 1992 and was to last for three months."9
However, UNTAC was afforded sufficient time so that it could extend
the registration period to January 31, 1993, in order to accomplish more
fully the task of registering the eligible populace.'9" Contrast this to the
time allotted the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of
the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) assigned to monitor the December
1990 Haitian elections. Because of the sovereignty implications of
sending an observer mission to an independent country, the General
Assembly debated the matter for an extended period of time and did not
authorize the observer mission until October 10, 1990, about nine-and-a-
half weeks before the elections and some four months after the Haitian
Government had promulgated the electoral law.' 99 The ONUVEH team
was not fully operational until mid-October, when voter registration was
already well under way.2m
Another reason for the success of the registration drive was that the
electoral service worked well with other UNTAC components. For
example, there were some 350,000 refugees,"' most of whom lived in
camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. These refugees were to be
repatriated back into Cambodia and resettled.2' Because of extensive
cooperation between UNTAC branches, all were registered to vote on
arrival in Cambodia or in the camps and all received their voter cards in
Cambodia.203 Another example of beneficial coordination involved
registration teams being escorted by either the civilian police or military
195. See Colin Smith, Shadow Over Prince Sihanouk's Bell Epoque, OBSERVER (Lon-
don), December 1, 1991.
196. See Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 28.
197. CAMBODIA ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 66, at 1.
198. Id.
199. Stoelting, supra note 87, at 380-83; G.A. Res. 45/2, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
Agenda Item 154, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/2 (1990).
200. Stoelting, supra note 87, at 383, 392. Although it is true that the Haitian mission
did not need to register voters itself, it nonetheless needed to be present when voters were
being registered to ensure that no one was being excluded from registration for illegitimate
reasons. Id. at 410.
201. Actually, the refugees consisted of some 14,000 persons granted refugee status and
some 350,000 not granted refugee status. Ratner, supra note 50, at 28. The latter group were
to be repatriated by the United Nations. Id.
202. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at paras. 88-94.
203. lId at para. 93.
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components of UNTAC.' This allowed registration teams to go into
Khmer Rouge areas to which they were formally denied access. 5
Finally, this success is evidence that the U.N. can achieve significant
success when administrative control is completely within its power.
Because the registration was completely administered by UNTAC, there
was a level, of UNTAC control over one aspect of the mission which
was missing in many other parts of the mission. UNTAC proved that it
had the dedication and expertise to accomplish the job in a timely and
complete manner.
The high percentage of registration is, however, irrelevant if there is
an arbitrary restriction on the number of those who are allowed to vote.
Although reasonable age and residency restrictions have been universal-
ly allowed, restrictions generally must be scrutinized. The original re-
quirements for voting in Cambodia were quite expansive. The Paris
Agreements gave the vote to anyone over the age of eighteen born in
Cambodia or born to parents born in Cambodia.206 Not only did this
formula comport with notions of universal suffrage, it also aided in the
administration of the elections by making UNTAC's registration job
much easier. A voting requirement based on legal status, rather than
birth or parentage, would have been difficult to implement. Given
Cambodia's turbulent and chaotic past, determining whether an indi-
vidual was a citizen under an earlier Cambodian law would have been
extremely time consuming. It would also have unfairly denied the right
to vote to those whose citizenship had been withdrawn because they had
opposed a particular regime.
Further, the registration requirements skirted a long-standing argu-
ment about the status of Vietnamese in Cambodia. For historical rea-
sons, Cambodians have had a long-standing suspicion and hatred of
Vietnamese people. The recent manifestation of this includes the Khmer
Rouge's pogrom of kidnapping and massacring Vietnamese in Cambodia
in order to whip up support among the general populace. 2 7 This cam-
paign was largely successful, forcing the other three factions to follow
suit, albeit in a less violent fashion.' Since the Vietnamese pulled out
204. Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia, paras. 28-29, U.N. Doc. S/25124 (1993) [hereinafter Third Progress
Report].
205. Id.
206. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at annex 3, para. 4.
207. The most recent Khmer Rouge pogrom led to an exodus of Vietnamese in March
1993. Ben Kiernan, Let Cambodians Have Justice at Last, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1993, at A28.
208. The SOC government has stated that it could not guarantee the safety of those
ethnic Vietnamese returning home to Cambodia, necessitating a U.N. program to help the
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their troops in September 1989, these persons have had almost no
protection. It is true that some of these settlers are recent arrivals who
fled economic stagnation in Vietnam for the improved economic oppor-
tunities in Cambodia. However, others lived in Cambodia for genera-
tions, fled only when the Khmer Rouge threatened to massacre all
Vietnamese during their rule, and returned home when Vietnamese
forces invaded Cambodia. By granting the vote to those born in Cambo-
dia or born to parents who were born in Cambodia, the law allows
ethnic Vietnamese for whom Cambodia is home to vote, while disallow-
ing the the franchise to newcomers. This seems to be a sensible compro-
mise that balances the Cambodian fears that the Vietnamese are attempt-
ing to annex their land and take control with the right of indigenous
minorities to vote.2
Unfortunately, the U.N. Special Representative, in an attempt to
appease anti-Vietnamese sentiment, promulgated an electoral law with
tougher birth requirements, allowing suffrage only to those born in
Cambodia to a parent born in Cambodia or born overseas to parents and
grandparents born in Cambodia.210 Thus, first generation Vietnamese-
Cambodians were disenfranchised. The moral qualms about this spring
from three sources. First, this disenfranchisement of an ethnic minority
was a response to hatred of that ethnic minority."' Further, although it
is not unreasonable to exclude those who may have few ties to Cambo-
dia, most persons born in Cambodia and still living there today can be
reasonably presumed to have an interest in its future.212 Thus, one could
refugees. U.N. to Launch Aid Programme for Ethnic Vietnamese Stranded at Vietnam-
Cambodia Border, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, Aug. 16, 1993, available in NEXIS,
World Library, Txtlne File. Prince Ranariddh made a statement in late August, 1993 that he
felt the presence of ethnic Vietnamese caused serious difficulties for the new government.
Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodia Faces New Hostilities, THE AGE (Melbourne), August 30, 1993,
at 8.
209. The requirements also allow those Cambodians who have fled to vote as well.
Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 3, para. 3. However, such
persons were required to come to Cambodia to register, although polling stations were set up
in France, the United States and Australia to allow them to vote abroad. Fourth Progress
Report, supra note 11, at para. 25.
210. Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transition-
al Authority in Cambodia, paras. 13-14, U.N. Doc. S/24578 (1992) [hereinafter Second
Progress Report].
211. The racial motivation behind this law was made clear when FUNCINPEC and the BLDP
proposed changes to the electoral law that would have allowed Khmer Krom (ethnic Cambodians
born in or with a parent born in South Vietnam) in Cambodia to vote. Third Progress Report,
supra note 204, at par. 33. Such ethnic Cambodians could not vote under the amended electoral
law. Therefore, the Cambodian parties attempted to make an exception, on ethnic grounds, that
would have differentiated them from similarly situated Vietnamese. See id.
212. Imagine the two extremes of persons fitting under the definition of "first generation
Vietnamese-Cambodians." One extreme would be the person whose parents emigrated to
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argue that this unreasonableness may well violate the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires that there be no
unreasonable restrictions on the basis of "race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status. 21 3 Finally, the new electoral law directly violates
the Paris Agreements.1 4
However, as morally questionable as this restriction may be, it does
not call into doubt the freeness and fairness of the elections. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights recently stated a test to be used to evaluate
the legality of political restrictions. "[C]onditions [cannot] curtail the
rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and
deprive them of their effectiveness[.] ... In particular, such conditions
must not thwart the free expression of the opinion of the people in the
choice of the legislature.' 2M5 Neither the quality nor the magnitude of the
restriction denies free expression to the people. The birth requirement,
although restrictive, is not well outside of the bounds of reason nor is it
discriminatory on its face.2"6 In addition, the number of those affected
was probably not great enough to materially affect the elections. 1 7
Finally, there was little outcry from any of the political parties, the
Vietnamese-Cambodian party, or the Vietnamese government.
In addition, historical experience may serve to calm our unease over
this voting restriction. There have been two elections where new settlers
Cambodia to live there, who was born in Cambodia, and who has lived in Cambodia for
substantially all of his life. This person should clearly have the right to vote. The other
extreme is someone whose parents were in Cambodia only temporarily, who was born during
this temporary stay, who returned to Vietnam as an infant, has lived in Vietnam his entire
life, and is voting only at the behest of the Vietnamese government. This person should
clearly not have the right to vote. However, the former is probably more common than the
latter and the unfairness resulting from denying the former the vote outweighs the harm of
allowing the latter to vote. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the interested
Vietnamese-Cambodian would be any less interested than an ethnic Cambodian who was born
in the United States and has lived there all his life, but whose parents and grandparents were
born in Cambodia. Under the electoral laws, the former cannot vote, the latter can.
213. Covenant on Civil, supra note 91, at arts. 2, 25 (emphasis added).
214. Comprehensive Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 3, para. 4.
215. Mathieu-Mohin v. Belgium, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1987).
216. To its credit, UNTAC did not approve the Khmer Krom enfranchisement proposal.
See supra note 211. Because the proposal would have extended the franchise to persons based
purely on ethnic grounds, the Secretary-General found it to be inconsistent with the spirit of
the Paris Agreements. Third Progress Report, supra note 204, at para. 34.
217. However, there is no way to know for sure since there is little agreement on the
number of Vietnamese in Cambodia or the number of Vietnamese who had lived in Cambodia
for a generation or more. The CGDK claimed that in 1989 there were over 1.2 million
Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia. NGUYEN-VO, supra note 14, at 146. The SOC claimed that
there were only 80,000. Id. East bloc diplomats in Cambodia estimated a number in between,
400,000 to 450,000. Id. Further, the Vietnamese-Cambodian border is quite open so there is
no telling how any of these figures has changed since 1989.
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were at issue. At the time of the Fijian independence plebiscite the
population consisted of 50.12% immigrants from India and 41.58%
native Fijians."' However, the Indians were not allowed to dominate the
plebiscite. At the insistence of Fiji's trustee, Britain, a complicated
electoral system was used that basically gave equal representation to the
Indian settlers and Fijians.219
The U.N.'s mission in Western Sahara faces a problem that is even
more similar to the one in Cambodia. Since Spain officially relinquished
control in 1975, Morocco has claimed the Western Sahara. 220 Thousands
of Moroccans have crossed the border in Western Sahara since that time
to join those who were living there before 1975.221 In negotiations,
Morocco has insisted that these settlers be allowed to vote while the
Polisario, a West Saharan group that fought against the Spanish and then
the Moroccans, insist that the new settlers cannot be allowed to vote.
222
As a result of this argument, the elections have yet to be held despite
the fact that they were originally planned for 1992.223 Thus, the amend-
ment to the electoral laws in Cambodia was neither unprecedented nor
frivolous.
D. Open and Reasonable Candidacy Requirements
As with registration, the electoral law had few restrictions for can-
didates. Anyone eligible to vote could create a party. 2' The only re-
quirement was that each party obtain 5,000 signatures and that its plat-
form "be consistent with the principles and objectives of the Agreement
on a comprehensive political settlement." 5 In the past, this requirement
218. MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 21 n.122
(1982).
219. Id.
220. Kenneth B. Noble, New Dispute Roils Western Sahara: Who'll Vote?, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 1992, at A3.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. The elections are now scheduled for January, 1996. Farhan Haq, Security Council
Keeps Close Eye on MINURSO, Inter Press Service, June 29, 1995, available in NEXIS,
World Library, Inpres File. The U.N. mission, MINURSO, has been criticized for ineffective-
ness and inaccurate progress reporting. Id. The Polisario suspended its participation in
organizing the election. U.N. Calls on Morocco and Polisario to Settle Differences over
Sahara, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 30, 1995, available in NEXIS, World Library, Dpa
File.
224. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 3, para. 6. Because
of the proportional representation system, parties, not individuals, were deemed to be vying
for votes. Thus one had to create a political party in order to run. I&a "Party affiliation will be
required in order to stand for election to the constituent assembly." Id.
225. ld. at Annex 3, para. 5.
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has proven to be a reasonable method of keeping the number of parties
manageable for administrative and media-distribution purposes.226 This
proved to be true in Cambodia as well. For example, UNTAC noted no
problems in apportioning media access. Further, there were no reports of
confusion among the voters concerning the identities and position of the
parties, as there were in the 1990 Mongolian elections. 227 At the same
time, the rule requiring the gathering of 5,000 signatures did not unduly
restrict access to the political arena. Some 22 parties provisionally
applied to run in the elections and of that number, 20 were able to
gather the 5,000 signatures needed to be placed on the ballot.228 Thus,
the requirement made the process manageable yet did not constrain
voter choice in a significant way.
E. Adequate Voter Education and Opportunity to Campaign
The right to register political parties means nothing if those parties
cannot campaign. In Cambodia, UNTAC strictly enforced the rule that
no parties could campaign before April 7, 1993, six weeks before the
voting.22 Obviously, UNTAC could not stop informal methods of
campaigning (e.g., word of mouth), but there were no complaints of
formal methods of campaigning (e.g., rallies or advertisements) before
the campaign period. This rule denied the CPP an unfair advantage. The
CPP, because it could build from the foundation of the SOC, had the
only nationwide political organization when the Paris Agreements were
signed. And because of its connections to the SOC, it also had a signifi-
cant resource advantage. The other political parties had to be given time
to organize and gather resources and personnel. In addition, "[the voters]
may not know [immediately for whom they wish to vote], which is one
of the reasons that international legal supervision of elections is de-
signed to include an adequate period for candidacies to be developed
and to allow campaigning, so that voters can make the informed choice
that is at the center of free and fair elections.
' 230
226. International Election Observation, supra note 111, at 30. It has also been approved
by the European Commission as not violating participatory rights. See X. v. Federal Republic
of Germany, 5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 90, 94 (1976).
227. International Election Observation, supra note 111, at 30.
228. One of those that failed was the Party of Democracy Kampuchea of the Khmer
Rouge, which presumably could have gathered the 5,000 signatures, but refused to participate
in the elections.
229. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at paras. 7, 23. For example, the electoral
code promulgated by UNTAC forbade public meetings before the official opening of the
campaign period. lU. at para. 23.
230. Sovereignty and Human Rights, supra note 79, at 871.
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Although the situation in each country must be studied on its own
terms, Professor Reisman has noted that the agreement between the
government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti Liberacion
Nacional (FMNL) provides a useful standard.23' It allowed basic political
human rights such as a) freedom to canvass for new members; b) the
right to set up appropriate infrastructure; c) free exercise of the right to
assembly and mobilization of leaders; and d) freedom to use the me-
dia.232 The freedoms UNTAC sought to preserve in Cambodia closely
tracked the freedoms agreed to in the El Salvador elections. The Paris
Agreement guaranteed that the "freedoms of speech, assembly and
movement will be fully respected. 233 Although there were concerns
about compliance because of the harassment and attacks on opposition
party personnel by the SOC, for the most part, freedom of expression
occurred without a problem. The Secretary-General noted that some 200
rallies had occurred in 16 of 21 provinces since campaigning had started
and no significant disruptions had been reported.2" Further, UNTAC
offered campaigning assistance to any party that needed it. For example,
UNTAC provided air transport to the three parties that requested it -
FUNCINPEC, BLDP, and the Neutral Democratic Party of Cambodia.2 35
Finally, access to the media was not a significant problem.236
However, the right to campaign means little if the electorate at large
has no experience with free and fair elections and is kept in the dark
about the process itself. 237 Therefore, public enlightenment, correctly
viewed, must include voter education programs. When the elections are
being run by a neutral third-party, conducting a voter education program
is made easier by the fact that the elections administrator can conduct an
extensive and comprehensive voter education program without suspicion
that such a campaign is being used as another means for the dominant
231. International Election Observation, supra note 111, at 31.
232. Id. at 31-32; U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 31, at 39, U.N. Doc. S/23501
(1992).
233. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 3, para. 9.
234. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at paras. 32, 81.
235. Report Pursuant, supra note 105, at para. 8.
236. See infra part V.F.
237. A good voter education program can ensure, for instance, that local norms of free
and fair elections match objective international norms. In many instances voters have a better
and broader knowledge than observers about those actions and events which have a bearing
on whether an election is free and fair. However, as Professor Reisman notes, where they
have no experience with international norms of free and fair elections, the filter through
which they process this knowledge makes the end product less useful. International Election
Observation, supra note 11, at 24. However, if voters were knowledgeable about internation-
al norms, their perceptions of whether an election was free and fair could be an invaluable
resource to observers.
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party to gather support. UNTAC's primary efforts in this area were to
emphasize the secrecy of the ballot.238 For example, the leaders of the
three major political parties, the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and the BLDP,
appeared on television with the Special Representative in order to assure
voters of the secrecy of the ballots.239 In addition, there were also efforts
to make clear what the elections would entail. These included round-
table discussions with representatives of the 20 parties and posters and
banners explaining the electoral process to the people.' Finally, efforts
were made to make the media accessible to more voters. For example,
hundreds of thousands of radios donated by the Japanese government
were distributed throughout the country.21 The campaign can only be
deemed a success given the widespread turnout, the determination with
which voters went to the polls (i.e. ignoring shelling), and the "often
festive atmosphere" in which the voting was conducted.4 2 This com-
pares favorably to the situation in Romania, where the elections were
held four months after being called and a joint mission by the National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the National Republi-
can Institute for International Affairs found that lack of voter education
resulted in significant problems in voter registration.243
F. Access to the Media and Fairness in Reporting
Although the opposition parties filed complaints about lack of access
to SOC media and unfairness in reporting, UNTAC was able to comply
with the Paris Agreements which guaranteed that "[a]ll registered politi-
cal parties will enjoy fair access to the media, including the press,
television and radio."'  First, UNTAC attempted, with some success, to
make SOC media follow electoral guidelines by apportioning air time
amongst the opposition parties and to have fairer reporting. For exam-
ple, it was agreed that TVK, Phnom Penh's television station would
broadcast one hour a day of UNTAC election-related materials from the
political parties.4 5 Second, the specter of unequal media access was
238. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 105.
239. Report Pursuant, supra note 105, at para. 9.
240. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 107.
241. Id. at para. 106.
242. Results of the Elections, supra note 185, at para. 2.
243. See NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & NATIONAL
REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE MAY 1990 ELECTIONS IN
ROMANIA 22 (1992) [hereinafter NDIAA/NRIAA].
244. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 3, para. 9.
245. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at 17.
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diminished by the fact that the SOC controlled only a small portion of
the media. Both FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF/BLDP had radio stations
from the days when they were fighting the SOC.' UNTAC offered its
extensive facilities to all the parties. Radio UNTAC broadcast 15 hours
a day' and offered to each registered political party segments each
week for the broadcast of political materials and allowed a right of
response to any party that had been unfairly attacked or had its public
statements misrepresented. 8 Further, foreign observers noted that the
free press flourished after the SOC lifted its censorship laws.249 Finally,
billboards were erected to accommodate the posters of the various
parties.25 Thus, even if the SOC did not do its utmost to ensure fair
media access, other factors made this unnecessary.
This compares favorably to the U.N. mission to Nicaragua, where
the issue of free access to the media was considered to have been han-
dled well. Under its terms of reference, the United Nations Observer
Group for the Verification of Elections (ONUVEN) was to "verify that
all political parties have equitable access to State television and radio in
terms of both the timing and length of broadcasts." 251 However, the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) had maintained tight
censorship of the opposition press in the past. Thus, it was necessary to
have ONUVEN teams record radio and television broadcasts across the
nation and have a separate statistical unit search for bias based on media
ownership and broadcast content.252 Slanted reporting was harshly criti-
cized and brought to the attention of top officials, such as President
Daniel Ortega. 53 In Cambodia, not only was bias in the state media
spotted and attempts made to end it, but alternative media access was
provided as well.
246. Second Progress Report, supra note 210, at para. 60. In addition, FUNCINPEC
imported television broadcasting equipment for campaign purposes. Report Pursuant, supra
note 105, at para. 8.
247. Report Pursuant, supra note 105, at para 9.
248. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 76.
249. Branigin, supra note 61, at A12.
250. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 107.
251. Establishment and Terms of Reference of the United Nations Observer Mission to
Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 34, at 3,
U.N. Doc. A/44/375 (1989).
252. Third Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Observer Mission to
Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 34, at 18,
U.N. Doc. A/44/917 (1990).
253. Id at 18-22, 26. ONUVEN's report frankly criticized both public and private media
outlets for their lack of objectivity and "extremely violent language[.]" Id at 18-22.
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G. Opportunities for Popular Participation in Campaigning
Much of what falls under this category has been discussed before,
including the harassment of opposition party members and the ability to
campaign freely. However, one concern falling under this category that
has not been discussed is the length of time allotted for parties to pre-
pare for campaigning and elections. This is an important factor in deter-
mining the freeness and fairness of elections. For example, there was
doubt as to the freeness and fairness of the 1990 elections in Mongolia
and in Romania because of the short amount of time allotted to electoral
processes.' Such short organizational periods give a great advantage to
the existing party in power, which is already organized and is likely to
have branches nationwide. However, the opposition parties in Cambodia
had over one and a half years to prepare for the elections. The agree-
ment to hold elections in Cambodia was signed on October 23, 1991
and campaigning did not start until April 7, 1993. The elections were
held some months after that, starting May 23, 1993.
Another concern is the illegal use of government resources and
personnel. In its report, the OAS mission 'to the Dominican Republic
elections of 1962 noted that this was a major problem in those elec-
tions." For example, the mission recommended that disqualification of
voters not be put into the hands of the governmental electoral commis-
sion; that the military, police and judiciary be restricted in their political
activities; that parties be denied the ability to use public property for
political gain; and that all parties be provided equal access to the me-
dia. 2 6
The major concern in Cambodia was the use by the CPP of the
existing SOC governmental structure to campaign. UNTAC had to be
vigilant to ensure that the CPP did not use government facilities as a
base of operations, government resources to produce campaign materi-
als, and governmental personnel to persuade voters. There were numer-
ous complaints concerning this subject during the election campaign.
254. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, MONGOLIA IN MIDSTREAM: A FINAL
REPORT ON THE 1990 MONGOLIA ELECTIONS 8-10 (1990); U.N. Says it Won't Monitor
Romanian Elections, The Reuter Library report, Jan. 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Revwld file; See NDIAA/NRIAA, supra note 243, at 17 (Romanian opposition
leaders felt five month period before elections insufficient).
255. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MISSION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MISSION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ON ELECTORAL MATTERS, Pan American Un-
ion/Organization of American States 48-53 (1961).
256. Id at 16-17, 50-53.
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UNTAC attempted to emphasize the illegality of the actions by enacting
electoral laws disallowing specific acts, such as SOC personnel cam-
paigning while on-duty or the use of public buildings and vehicles for
political purposes.z 7 Further, UNTAC set up teams to monitor whether
provincial, district and village level governments were acting in a neu-
tral manner.258 Finally, punishment was actually meted out. For example,
a CPAF officer and a CPP district chief were disqualified from voting
for "improper conduct in violation of the Electoral Law.' 259 Nonetheless,
problems continued. UNTAC conceded as much when it wrote,
"[a]nalysis of the SOC documents to which UNTAC has gained access
indicates widespread and persistent use of the SOC state apparatus to
conduct political campaign activities of the Cambodian People's Party
(CPP) in which state employees - police, armed forces and civil ser-
vants - are mobilized for CPP electioneering." 26 Despite these prob-
lems, UNTAC did not use its power under the Paris Agreements to
disqualify the CPP for lack of adherence to the Code of Conduct.26'
However, it would be unfair to blame UNTAC for its failure to end
these activities. In a country where the dominant political party and the
government are so inextricably intertwined, it would be impossible to
expect the complete cessation of such activities. Despite the unprece-
dented size and responsibilities of the civilian contingent of UNTAC,
such a monitoring job would have been beyond its capability. Perhaps it
is enough that the violations were not so flagrant as to demoralize
opposition parties.
H. Suppression of Foreign Participation
This is a particularly acute issue in Cambodia because the civil war
between the SOC and FUNCINPEC, the Khmer Rouge, and the KPNLF
had clear international dimensions. As noted earlier, the Khmer Rouge
received significant support from China and Thailand up to the point in
time when the Paris Agreements were signed. There is every indication
257. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 60. Similar measures were enacted
for the CPAF, which agreed to prohibit the wearing of CPP insignia on uniforms and the
posting of CPP posters on military buildings. Id. at para. 64.
258. Id at para. 58.
259. Report Pursuant, supra note 105, at para. 7.
260. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 59.
261. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 3, para. 7 ("UNTAC
will confirm that political parties and candidates meet the established criteria in order to
qualify for participation in the election. Adherence to the a Code of Conduct established by
UNTAC in consultation with the SNC will be a condition for such participation.").
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that this aid has ceased except for the illicit Thai trade noted above. 262
However, support received by the Khmer Rouge is not an important
factor in our election analysis because the Khmer Rouge refused to
participate in the elections and largely failed in their attempts to disrupt
the voting.
An issue that is important is the foreign support for the CPP. The
Paris Agreements require that each party "refrain from interference in
any form whatsoever, whether direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of
Cambodia. ''"" 3 Although other sections of the Agreement clearly spell
out an end to military aid,26 this prohibition also encompasses campaign
contributions violative of the UNTAC's mission to create a neutral
political environment or commerce violative of the SNC embargo on
gems and lumber.265 Each of the factions thus stopped receiving support
from its sponsors. One of the most serious complaints concerning this
prohibition was that of the Khmer Rouge, which accused the Vietnam-
ese of leaving advisors to help the SOC and CPP. The most substantiat-
ed claim concerned three men of Vietnamese ethnicity, two of whom
were working with the armed forces of the SOC, while the other had
worked with the SOC armed forces in the past.266 It turned out that the
three men in question were "all married to Cambodian women and had
262. As late as July 25, 1993, Qian Qichen stated that China was opposed to any faction
in Cambodia coming to power by military means and that China would no longer supply
military arms to any rebel faction. Lindsay Murdoch, A New Chance for the Khmer Rouge,
THE AGE (Melbourne), July 26, 1993, at 13. The new Cambodian government has made it
clear that it believes the Chinese have stopped supplying the Khmer Rouge. Anthony Lewis,
'In Pol Pot Time', N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1993, at A15. Even the Khmer Rouge's spokesman,
Mak Ben, denied as "groundless rumours" reports that the Khmer Rouge were using brand
new weapons supplied from China. Khmer Rouge Warns U.N. Over 'Illegal' Elections,
Agence France Presse, May 21, 1993, available in NEXIS, World Library, Afp File.
The Thais seem also to have disengaged themselves from the Khmer Rouge. They shut
down Unit 838, a special military unit through which flowed most of the Chinese and Thai
aid destined for the Khmer Rouge. Lindsay Murdoch, Khmer Rouge Are Still Free to Cross
Their Last Frontier, THE AGE (Melbourne), October 26, 1993, at 13. The Thai government
has made a commitment to equip and train the new unified army of Cambodia. Army Agrees
to Train Khmer Forces, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 15, 1993, at 3. In addition, the Thai Army
Commander-in-Chief, General Wimol Wongwanich, has ordered that those military officers
with the most blatant dealings with the Khmer Rouge be transferred from duty in the Thai-
Cambodian border areas. Murdoch, Khmer Rouge Are Still Free to Cross Their Last Frontier,
supra.
263. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex III, art. 2, para. 2(b).
Because the signatories include all the major nations involved in the Cambodian conflict over
the last several decades, the agreement should be considered to encompass the nations needed
to make it effective.
264. See, e.g., id at sec. C, para. 1(c), requiring UNTAC to monitor "the cessation of
outside military assistance to all Cambodian Parties .... "
265. Third Progress Report, supra note 204, at paras. 11-12.
266. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 47.
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children, and there was no suggestion that they were under the control
of Vietnamese authorities." 7 They were found to be "foreign forces"
under the Paris Agreements because they were former members of the
Vietnamese occupation forces.26' The two working with CPAF were
fired and all three were asked to leave Cambodia.269 Thus, the most
serious case of foreign intervention was minor at best and was dealt
with in an uncompromising manner. It does not seem that foreign inter-
vention played a large role in the Cambodian elections.
This compares favorably to the elections held in Namibia in 1989
that marked the relinquishing of control by South Africa of that trust
territory. Those elections were determined free and fair despite the
presence of South African and South Western African People's Organi-
zation (SWAPO) troops.27 In addition, there was criticism of the U.N.'s
failure to deal with coercive activities carried out by South African
forces against the voters and South Africa's tight control of the media.27'
I. Fair Districting and Parliamentary Structure
There was little dispute amongst the parties on this criterion. Voting
was to be conducted within the existing political boundaries. Although
there was some worry that the decades of fighting and mass murder in
Cambodia had caused significant demographic changes, this was re-
solved by an agreement to proportion seats on the basis of UNTAC's
registration of voters.272 Finally, no legislative powers were to be vested
in any body beyond the reach of the popular will. There was to be no
apartheid-like system of unequal chambers such as the one that used to
exist in South Africa.273 All legislative power was vested in a single
body, all of whose members were to be elected by the populace.274
J. Neutrality of the Supervising Mechanism
Few organizations have the capability to be as impartial as the
United Nations. The U.N. contingent came from 44 countries; many of
267. Id. at para. 47.
268. Id. at para. 46.
269. Id.
270. Election Supervision: The United Nations Experience in Namibia and Nicaragua,
supra note 4, at 2-5.
271. Symposium, Transitions to Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 965, 1077-78 (1990) (Remarks of Gay McDougall).
272. International Election Observation, supra note 111, at 38.
273. This system violates international law. See G.A. Res. 150, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
Agenda Item 110, at 3, para. 8, U.N. Doc. AIRES/45/150 (1991).
274. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at pt. 2, art. 12.
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which had no real stake in the results of the elections in Cambodia.
However, it must be noted that the perceptions of the electorate are
more relevant than objective perceptions. If the people believe the U.N.
to be partial, that destroys the ability to have a free and fair election, for
that perception will affect the peoples' behavior.27 5
Not surprisingly, each of the major parties claimed that UNTAC was
prejudiced against it to the advantage of its opponents. The Khmer
Rouge early on accused the U.N. of not truly monitoring the withdrawal
of Vietnamese forces and not giving the SNC enough power.27 6 No
doubt, the UNTAC forces did not give the Khmer Rouge the benefit of
the doubt in many instances, but this was in response to the Khmer
Rouge's concerted program of violence against U.N. personnel and its
sabotage of the elections. After it finished second in the elections, the
CPP also accused the U.N. of committing voting irregularities.277 The
opposition parties accused the U.N. of not doing anything to stop SOC
violence and not taking more complete control of the SOC apparatus to
provide for a more level playing field.27
However, there is reason to believe that this was mainly posturing
by the parties.27 9 The parties which complained the most, the CPP,
FUNCINPEC, and BLDP, won 119 of the 120 seats in the new legisla-
275. Note that this is different from arguing that the perception of the voters is a criteria
in itself for determining free and fair elections. Whereas the latter argument would allow
voters' perceptions to cause an election to be declared free and fair where it may not meet
objective international norms (i.e., in some sense replacing local norms with international
norms), I argue that voter perceptions affect the raw data (i.e., voter behavior) that are used in
determining whether international norms are met.
276. Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia, para. 12, U.N. Doc. S/24090 (1992). There was never any evidence
that either of these allegations was true. Additionally, on the issue of Vietnamese withdrawal,
most countries stated that they believed the Vietnamese to have withdrawn from Cambodia.
PEACEKEEPING: 1990, supra note 48, at 2-3. Nonetheless, UNTAC attempted to appease the
Khmer Rouge by strengthening its border checkpoints and mobile military investigation teams
and giving top priority to the recruitment and deployment of civil administration personnel.
Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia, para. 11, U.N. Doc. S/24286 (1992).
277. Results of the Elections, supra note 185, at para. 10.
278. See, e.g., Third Progress Report, supra note 204, at paras. 14-15 (stating that
Sihanouk and Ranariddh temporarily refused to cooperate with UNTAC because of the
persistent violent attacks against FUNCINPEC personnel).
279. In fact, UNTAC's neutrality was quite even-handed. For example, well after it was
clear that the Khmer Rouge would not be participating in the cease-fire, cantonment, and
demobilization stages of the Paris Agreements, UNTAC protested the movement of SOC
tanks and armoured vehicles nearer to.Pailin, the Khmer Rouge headquarters. Report of the
Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Counsel Resolution 792, para. 7, U.N.
Doc. S/25289 (1993) [hereinafter Report on Resolution 792]. The Secretary-General argued
that the movement, because it occurred in conjunction with artillery fire, constituted a
"serious cease-fire violation" despite admitting that such activity had occurred in the past. ld.
The SOC later agreed to pull back. Id.
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ture. Further, little complaint was heard from FUNCINPEC and BLDP
as soon as the election results were announced. Although the SOC
initially threatened not to relinquish power, it later agreed to the election
results. Even the Khmer Rouge muted its criticism of the legitimacy of
the government when it attempted to negotiate a place in the new gov-
ernment.
UNTAC's neutrality compares favorably with the ill-fated United
Nations election monitoring missions in Korea. In 1948, the General
Assembly created the United Nations Commission on Korea
(UNCOK).28° This body, and its successor, UNCOK II, oversaw two
elections in Korea but its inspection of the electoral process was curso-
ry.21 UNCOK II overlooked serious problems such as jailing of oppo-
sition leaders and refused to look into electoral irregularities, subse-
quently declaring the second election to be free and fair. 2 A subsequent
U.N. body (established in 1952) also provided only a cursory inspection
of the 1952 Korean elections and again found no significant irregulari-
ties in the process despite evidence of police coercion.
283
K. Appropriate Polling Procedures
There was little dispute about the appropriateness of the polling
procedure. The Paris Agreements stated that the "[v]oting will be by
secret ballot, with provision made to assist those who are disabled or
who cannot read or write."'2 84 There were no complaints that the process
was anything other than secret and private. Security was provided by the
civilian police and military components of UNTAC according to estima-
tions of the danger involved. There were no significant attacks on the
polling stations and so the integrity of the polling stations was main-
tained.
In addition, an effort was made to give the opportunity to every
person who wanted to vote. Voting was open from 8:00 A.M. to 4:00
P.M. every day during the voting period and was even extended on the
last day to accommodate all voters.285 There were approximately 1,400
fixed polling stations and 200 mobile stations throughout the country,8 6
280. Stoelting, supra note 87, at 376.
281. Id.
282. Id. The first Commission, UNCOK, declined to voice an opinion as to the freeness
and fairness of the first elections. Id.
283. Id.
284. Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at Annex 3, para. 8.
285. Results of the Elections, supra note 185, at para. 2.
286. Id.
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with other polling stations in Paris, New York, and Sydney for overseas
Cambodians.2 7 UNTAC used the mobile voting stations to great suc-
cess. These stations operated in order to allow persons living in difficult
to reach areas or with limited transportation the ability to vote. While
some mobile voting stations moved about throughout the entire voting
period, many stationary polling stations were converted into mobile
stations on May 26 and operated as mobile stations between May
27-28."' There was also a process for those who had lost their registra-
tion cards or were voting in a place different from where they had
registered to tender their ballots and have them accepted pending verifi-
cation by handwriting and fingerprinting experts.289 This made quite a
difference as 7% of all votes came as tendered ballots.290
These balloting procedures compare favorably to other elections that
have been marred by administrative and logistical problems. For exam-
ple, in the 1990 elections held in Haiti and the 1991 elections held in El
Salvador and Paraguay, polling stations opened late or had to close




Nonetheless, these problems were not seen as serious enough to cause
election observers to question the freeness and fairness of the process.2
L. Adequate Ballot Counting Procedures
Here again, there were no serious problems. Although the CPP
claimed that numerous ballot counting irregularities had occurred in-
volving tampered or insecure ballot boxes,293 this seemed mainly to be
posturing after the results of the elections were declared. None of the
allegations were proven to be true or significant in affecting the vote. In
287. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 25.
288. This conversion made sense because the largest number of votes, about 46% of the
total, were turned in on the first day. Cambodia Election Results, supra note 197, at 1-2.
With most of the voters coming in the first two or three days, it made sense to convert to
mobile stations to reach those hardest to reach.
289. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 29.
290. Id. at 1.
291. United Nations Electoral Assistance to Haiti, U.N. Dept. of Pub. Info., at 4, U.N.
Doc. ST/DPI/1 120 (1991); Second Report of the Secretary-General on the Electoral Process
in El Salvador, at 10, OAS Doc., OEA/Ser. G/CP/INF.3101/91 Add.1 (Nov. 13, 1991);
Report of the Secretary-General on the Observation of the Municipal Elections in Paraguay,
at 14, OAS Doc., OEA/Ser. G/CP/INF.3194/91 (Nov. 13, 1991). The elections in Kurdish-
controlled Northern Iraq had to be postponed due to the erasability of indelible ink used to
discourage double voting. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, STATEMENT ON THE
MAY 1992 ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ 5-6 (1992). The elections were nonetheless
declared free and fair. Id. at 7.
292. Padilla & Houppert, supra note 83, at 11-112, 115, 122.
293. Results of the Elections, supra note 185, at para. 10.
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the end, the CPP admitted that the elections were free and fair and
joined with the government. Because it was the U.N. itself that did the
vote counting, it was never necessary to have an internationally ob-
served parallel vote count.' The only problem was that the UNTAC's
count took longer than anticipated because it wanted to ensure the ac-
curacy of the results.295 However, UNTAC attempted to keep all parties
up to date by issuing reports twice a day.
92%
M. Good-Faith Implementation of the Results
Obviously, no election could be legitimate if its results were to be
ignored. Examples include the elections in Algeria which the govern-
ment canceled after it became clear that the Islamic Salvation Front was
going to be victorious 297 or when General Manuel Noriega invalidated
the results of the May 1989 elections after it became clear to him that
the opposition candidate had won.298 This part of the elections signifies
both a great success and great failure in Cambodia. The success was the
fact that the SOC did in fact cede power to the opposition parties that
had won seats in the election. Initially, the CPP and SOC claimed
voting irregularities and threatened that they would not recognize the
results of the elections. There was also a short-lived "secession" led by
a CPP candidate who also happened to be Ranariddh's half-brother and
Sihanouk's son. 299 However, all of this came to naught as the CPP and
SOC agreed to the election results and the CPP took its seats in the
legislature. Although it is not clear to what extent the SOC will give up
power within the administrative and security branches of the govern-
ment, there is cause for optimism as the Assembly successfully passed a
Constitution, the armies of the three factions (KPNLF, FUNCINPEC,
and SOC) have integrated and have begun in earnest to prosecute a
campaign against the Khmer Rouge, and there have been no serious
challenges to the government since the elections.
However, this cooperation came at a price. Cambodia, despite the
elections, apparently could not shed its past immediately. The CPP
294. In fact, public opinion polls were banned under the electoral laws for fear that they
might have an intimidation effect. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 23.
295. Results of the Elections, supra note 185, at para. 11.
296. Id.
297. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Algeria Militants Callfor Uprising, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1992,
at Al; Alfred Hermida, Algeria Election Called Off After President Quits, THE TIMES
(London), Jan. 13, 1992, at 1.
298. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, supra note 97, at 52-57.
299. Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodian Leaders Threaten to Secede, THE AGE (Melbourne),
June 11, 1993, at 1.
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agreed to join the government only after protracted backroom negotia-
tions involving Sihanouk, Ranariddh, and Son Sann. Ranariddh became
the first prime minister and Hun Sen the second prime minister. Son
Sann was named speaker of the Assembly. Such backroom negotiations
are typical of Cambodia's past and seem to flaunt the spirit of the
elections. The legislators of the Assembly merely rubberstamped this
powersharing arrangement which had been created by a few men. The
Assembly also reinstituted the monarchy with Sihanouk as king. Al-
though he formally has only oversight and veto powers, Sihanouk's
Assembly-given general mandate to protect Cambodia, his past role as a
central player in Cambodian politics, and the debt FUNCINPEC owes to
him ensures that Sihanouk will wield quite a bit of influence.
However, it may be going too far to despair over the situation. To
require Cambodia to transform itself into a perfectly democratic and
open society overnight is unrealistic. Cambodia and its leaders simply
have no tradition or experience with democracy, have been through two
decades of war and mass murder, and still face the menace of the
Khmer Rouge. There are times when our own legislators make
backroom deals and under conditions much less stressful. It is possible
that the Assembly may in time outgrow its strongman leaders and act as
a true representative of the people.
N. Global View
Of course, each election is unique, as is the cultural and geographic
context in which it occurs. The factors listed above are only general
guidelines useful to our determination of the freeness and fairness of the
elections, but are not dispositive of the issue. If one could merely go
down a checklist to determine whether elections are free and fair, the
job of international lawyers would be much simplified. To make a more
comprehensive analysis of the freeness and fairness of an election, one
must look at the base definition of a free and fair election. There seems
to be a consensus that the election results must reflect the true will of
the people.
If we look at the elections from this vantage point, the results are
hardly surprising. It is widely acknowledged that FUNCINPEC won on
the popularity of Sihanouk, even though his son Ranariddh was the
party's nominal leader.3" Sihanouk in many ways is the George Wash-
ington and Abraham Lincoln of Cambodia, achieving independence for
300. Mark Baker, Prince Runamund Plays the Devil They Know, THE AGE (Melbourne),
June 9, 1993, at 18.
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Cambodia and guiding the country through a time of great crisis during
the Vietnam War. For all of his eccentricities, he is easily the most
popular man in Cambodia, and this is recognized at home and abroad.
The unanimous decision to reinstate him as king is only one indication
of his popularity.'3' Thus, given Sihanouk's popularity, it is no surprise
that FUNCINPEC won the elections. It is similarly no surprise that the
CPP came in second. Although the CPP may be hated for its relations
with the Vietnamese government, it is associated with the overthrow of
the murderous Khmer Rouge. It had also been the de facto government
of Cambodia for over thirteen years and, as a result of this, had the
greatest exposure to the largest number of voters.
The opinions of the vast majority of the world community support
the conclusion that the elections were free and fair. The United Nations
Security Council has recognized the results of the election.m3° Thailand
has recognized the election results303 and its Prime Minister has vowed
to seek closer relations with the new government.'3 4 The United States
has normalized relations with the new Cambodian government, upgrad-
ing its mission to a full embassy. 305 The French have agreed to send
military experts to train the new army. 306 The Vietnamese government
has stated its willingness to accept the new government. 307 Even the
301. Another example of the indicator of Sihanouk's popularity is his ability to affect the
foreign policy of other countries. For example, after the elections, the United States stated that
it would find it difficult to give aid to the coalition government if the Khmer Rouge were
given a role within the new government. Lippman, supra note 62, at A9. Prince Sihanouk
canceled peace talks with the Khmer Rouge and announced that the United States' actions
were severely hampering the new government's ability to deal with the Khmer Rouge and to
govern Cambodia. Sihanouk Irked at U.S., WASH. POST, July 21, 1993, at A14. The United
States then made an announcement that its prior statement had been misconstrued and that it
may, in fact, give aid to a coalition government that included the Khmer Rouge. John M.
Goshko, U.S. Eases Stance on Cambodia Aid, WASH. POST, July 25, 1993, at A21.
302. Accord On Interim Rule Reported, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1993, at A8.
303. Thailand 'Recognises' UNTAC's Poll Results, supra note 63, at 6.
304. Chuan Vows to Promote ies With Cambodia, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 14, 1993, at 7.
305. U.S. Establishes Diplomatic ies With Cambodia After 18 Years, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
1, 1993, at A4.
306. France to Help Train Cambodia's New Army, WASH. TDMES, July 7, 1993, at A2.
307. "The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam expresses its willingness to
recognise a new government in Cambodia to be elected by a constitutional National Assem-
bly," the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry affirmed. Vietnam Will Recognise Cambodia's New
Government to Be Elected By A Constitutional National Assembly, Vietnam Investment
Review, June 7, 1993, available in NEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File. During a visit to
Hanoi, Cambodian co-prime ministers Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen met with
Vietnamese leaders Party Secretary-General Do Muoi, President Le Due Anh and Premier Vo
Van Kiet. Muoi told his guests that Hanoi "would work relentlessly to strengthen the durable
friendship, good neighbourliness and fraternal solidarity between the two countries." Nguyen
Tri Dung, Cambodian Co-Premiers Hailed in Hanoi, Vietnamese Investment Review, Aug.
30, 1993, available in NEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
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Khmer Rouge have sent emissaries to the new government seeking an
advisory role. °8 Thus, countries and political groups with vastly differ-
ent ideological, geographical, and economic interests have recognized
the election results.
Finally, some argue that the perception of the people, those who are
to be governed, is relevant. "The people who must live under the politi-
cal process are the ones who themselves ultimately must determine
whether an election has been free and fair."' It would seem that the
new government is also seen as legitimate at home, where 1,500-2,000
Khmer Rouge soldiers have defected since the installation of the new
government.310 In Kompong Thom province in early September, Colonel
Sy Ninh, a twenty-year veteran of the Khmer Rouge and commander of
the much feared Division 616, and his men defected to the new govern-
ment.311 "We were not told the truth. We were told we were fighting to
defend Cambodia from the Vietnamese .... But in the end we realised
we were only killing Cambodians," he said.312
One might still have the philosophical problem that the Cambodian
people could not have wanted a regime that is in some respects still
undemocratic. Those Cambodian leaders who have ruled largely through
force for the past half-century or more are still in power after the elec-
tions. None of these men has any experience running a country by
democratic methods, and their only connections to democracy are their
recent assertions that they now whole-heartedly favor democracy. Our
skepticism only increases when we realize that each of the four major
factions has ruled Cambodia at one time or another and none availed
themselves of the democratic methods. This uneasiness is buttressed by
the harassment and violence that occurred during the campaigning
period and the human rights abuses that continue today.31 3 However,
308. Khmer Rouge Talk Peace But Keep Shooting, supra note 184, at 1.
309. International Observation ofElections, supra note 106, at 376 (remarks by Stephen
Schneebaum). Larry Garber agrees with this observation; however, Professor Reisman notes
that "[iln countries in which the political culture is unfamiliar with elections, the subjective
appreciation may simply not be congruent with fundamental international norms." Internation-
al Election Observation, supra note 111, at 24.
310. William Branigin, supra note 48, at A15. The number of defections for the first six
months of 1993 was 300. Id. The U.N. has confirmed at least 1,500 defectors. Id. These
defections will only make the new government stronger as many of the Khmer Rouge are to
be integrated into the new unified army, according to Tea Banh, the deputy defense minister.
Murdoch, supra note 78, at 28.
311. Murdoch, supra note 184, at 28. There are reports that Division 616 has practically
disintegrated. Branigin, supra note 48, at AIS.
312. Murdoch, supra note 184, at 28.
313. For example, Brig. Gen. Phom Salin of the Cambodian army became annoyed at a
neighbor who was driving in nails to set up a mosquito net. The General, possibly drunk,
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Padilla and Houppert note that "[i]n examining what is 'free and fair,' it
is important to keep a balance between the minimal necessary standards
and the context of each particular election. 314 Thus, it may be unrealis-
tic to require that the elections in Cambodia meet our conception of an
election that is completely free and fair. Given Cambodia's past, it is a
significant achievement that the elections were to a large extent free and
fair.
0. Freeness and Fairness of the Elections
Thus, although there were certainly problems in the conduct of the
elections, in each of the categories enunciated by Professor Reisman, the
Cambodian experience compares favorably to other elections. In addi-
tion, the results of the elections correspond with our rough predictions
of popularity based on a global view of economic, political, and histori-
cal factors. Therefore, the elections in Cambodia were free and fair, and
the results of the elections should be honored.
V. CAMBODIA AND UNITED NATIONS CRITERIA WHEN
DETERMINING WHETHER TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN ELECTIONS
The decision to monitor or supervise elections in an independent
country is wholly unlike the decision to hold a plebiscite, referendum, or
election in a non-self-governing territory. Once a determination has been
made that a trust or similar territory should become independent of its
overseer, the only decision to be made is whether it should be indepen-
dent, join in association with another independent country, or become
part of an independent country. Because the International Court of
Justice's ruling in the Western Sahara case proclaims that free and fair
elections are the best way to make such a decision3"5 and because of the
widespread legitimacy of free and fair elections,316 it is largely a fore-
gone conclusion what method will be chosen to make such a decision.
Thus, once the U.N. has determined that a non-self-governing territory is
to become independent, it is a moot question whether or not to hold
elections. However, because governments can only request and not
demand U.N. monitoring and because of considerations of sovereignty
killed the neighbor in plain sight of many bystanders. Despite this, he remained uncharged
and no one dared to testify against him. Philip Shenon, Cambodia Finds Its Own Troops Add
to Brutality, N.Y. TIMEs, July 11, 1993, at Al.
314. Padilla & Houppert, supra note 83, at 86.
315. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 37 (Oct. 16) (right of self determination requires "a
free and genuine expression of the will of the people").
316. Franck, supra note 79, at 63; Reisman, supra note 79, at 871.
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under the U.N. Charter,317 the decision whether to monitor elections in
independent countries is discretionary.
In order to facilitate the making of this decision, a set of criteria has
been developed. The Secretary-General of the U.N. has enunciated the
following standard when deciding whether the U.N. should involve itself
in the elections of an independent country:
[R]equests should pertain primarily to situations with a clear inter-
national dimension; the monitoring of an election or referendum
should cover the entire electoral process in order to secure condi-
tions of fairness and impartiality;,,where the induction of a United
Nations presence in the electoral process of a State at a critical
point in its political life is sought by the Government concerned,
there must be broad public support in the State for the United
Nations assuming such a role; and finally, there should be approval
by the competent organ. 8
The Secretary-General encouraged electoral involvement but with signif-
icant caution: "[e]lectoral verification by the United Nations should
remain an exceptional activity of the Organization to be undertaken in
well-defined circumstances., 31 9 Finally, several commentators have made
attempts to use past historical experience to determine if there are
standards and criteria to which the U.N. can look in determining wheth-
er to participate in elections. 320 Although an examination of each of
these criteria is beyond the scope of this paper, it may be useful to note
here how the U.N. mission in Cambodia can bring into question the
validity of some criteria and furnish a more robust understanding of
others.
317. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 17. Because non-self-governing territories usually have no
government or no body recognized as such, there is simply no body that has standing to argue
the sovereignty issue with respect to such territories.
318. Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections:
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 1 79, U.N. Doc. A/46/609 (1991).
319. Id. 78.
320. See Ebersole, supra note 7, at 118 (administrative capacity of the country, demo-
cratic history, time-table for elections, political factors, security factors, and availability of
regional and nongovernmental organizations); Evans & Olidge, supra note 85, at 1739
(knowledge and desire to govern oneself); Melida N. Hodgson, When to Accept, When to
Abstain: A Framework for U.N. Election Monitoring, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 137, 145
(1992) (international dimension, coverage of entire election process, provisions of the
elections, democratic tradition, whether election monitoring is an effort to legitimize an
illegitimate government, cost, availability of other observers); Stoelting, supra note 87, at
386-87 (international dimension, presence during entire electoral process, national consensus
on U.N. participation, terms of reference, and preparatory teams).
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A. U.N. Involvement Must Cover the Entire Electoral Process
First, the Cambodian mission leads to the conclusion that the re-
quirement that the mission encompass "the entire electoral process, both
in chronological as well as in geographic terms" has been understood
too narrowly. When most observers think about covering the entire
electoral process in a chronological way, they often mean a period of
time stretching from the pre-election period, usually starting from the
registration of voters or the beginning of campaigning, to the end of the
election itself. However, this focus tends to ignore the post-election
period, which may have much to do with the eventual effectiveness of
the elections.
Elections cannot stand alone in a teleological sense. That is, elec-
tions should not be seen as a goal in and of themselves, but as one
discrete, tangible, and easily monitored aspect of democracy.32" ' Thus,
elections are not the same thing as democracy nor do they necessarily
lead to democracy. Nonetheless, no election could be considered truly
successful unless it led to the creation or continuance of a democratic
system of government.322 That is, elections are not successful unless they
lead to further elections. For example, many of the instruments de-
scribed above call not only for free and fair elections, but for periodic
elections as well.
However, "[i]t is easy to monitor an election, but assisting a people
in becoming self-determinate requires preparing those people to be self-
governing on a continuous basis." '323 The best course of action to ensure
democracy in the wake of an election is to protect human rights in the
post-election period. Democracy requires not only free and fair elections
when the people have a choice in their governance, but it also presup-
poses that there be protection of human rights during those times when
the people are not voting and, therefore, are powerless against their
government. Otherwise, it would be largely meaningless to have a
flawless campaign and election only to have the newly installed govern-
ment abuse human rights and refuse to hold future elections. Thus, hope
321. Evans & Olidge, supra note 85, at 1752. "By legitimizing a democratic process
without accepting an ongoing responsibility for the furtherance of representative government,
the international community limits the act of self-determination to an isolated occurrence." Id.
(footnote omitted).
322. However, Olidge and Evans argue that this might not necessarily be true. Id. at
1736-41.
323. l at 1739.
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for Cambodia lies in effective political education programs and a greater
awareness of human and political rights among the populace.3'
There is also a more practical reason to view the scope of the elec-
toral process more broadly. Professor Reisman has noted that election
results "serve as evidence of popular sovereignty and become the basis
for international endorsement of the elected government." 325 Thus, it is
largely impossible to legitimize a particular electoral process without
also legitimating the specific government elected through that process. It
would be costly indeed in terms of reputation if a United Nations legiti-
mated government flagrantly refused to have elections or seriously
abused human rights. The same would be true if the United Nations
allowed the new government to be illegitimately thrown of out of office,
as happened in Haiti in 1991. Furthermore, it would be ridiculous to
believe that the United Nations was willing to pay $1.5-$2.0 billion and
risk the lives of thousands of its personnel merely for Cambodia to have
one and only one free and fair election. Presumably, another goal would
be to have a democratic Cambodia. However, everything the United
Nations paid and risked is lost if the fragile foundations of democracy in
Cambodia are destroyed.
Cambodia thus highlights the fact that, even once the election results
are announced, the work of the world community is far from done.
Human rights abuses may still occur. And the backroom dealing of the
new government to apportion positions of power is equally troubling.
Combine these issues with an ongoing conflict with the Khmer Rouge
and one has the sense, perhaps not of impending doom, but at least of
uneasiness.326 Although the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights did adopt a resolution calling for the Centre for Human Rights in
324. By this, I do not mean merely the fact that the populace are told and understand that
they have these rights, but also a building up of the conviction that these rights are rightfully
theirs, are inalienable and are worth the effort to retain them. To this extent, the Human Rights
Component of UNTAC used "dialogues" appearing on television, radio and in the press;
television mini-dramas; news programs; interviews; leaflets; posters; news magazines; and spot
radio announcements to educate Cambodians about their rights and where to go if they are
violated. The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and Its Application to Peoples Under
Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation, Situation in Cambodia, U.N. ESCOR
Commission on Human Rights, 49th Sess., 36, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/19/Add.1 (1993).
325. Reisman, supra note 79, at 868-69.
326. The Secretary-General admitted as much when he stated:
The elections seem likely to take place at a time when the two biggest armed
forces of the parties will remain largely intact and the other two parties will also
still have some of their forces in the field. Recent weeks have demonstrated the
risk that this state of affairs can lead to major hostilities; evidently that risk could
become greater after the elections.
Report on Resolution 792, supra note 279, at para. 41 (emphasis added).
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Cambodia to support fledgling indigenous human rights organizations in
Cambodia,327 and there was talk of appointing a special representative on
human rights to monitor the situation in Cambodia.328 There is no indi-
cation that these few individuals can effectively do their jobs when
faced with the United Nations' indifference caused by the euphoria of
the success of the elections in Cambodia.
B. Broad Support Within a State for U.N. Involvement
Another criterion whose meaning can be informed by the Cambodi-
an mission's experience is that there be "broad support within a state for
U.N. involvement." At least two commentators have interpreted this to
mean that "[a]uthorization of U.N. involvement also requires all major
political groups to agree to the U.N. presence 3 29 or an "agreement by
all concerned parties and the general public on the need for an election
and the utility of U.N. involvement. . .,330 However, note that there is
a distinction between broad support and the support of all concerned
parties. One can have broad support without having unanimous support.
In Cambodia, the mission was hampered from the beginning by the
Khmer Rouge's refusal to participate in the elections. Nonetheless, the
Secretary-General's representative in Cambodia decided to follow the
schedule without delay while attempting to coax and coerce the Khmer
Rouge back into the fold.331
327. Fourth Progress Report, supra note 11, at para. 20.
328. Id.
329. Stoelting, supra note 87, at 392.
330. Ebersole, supra note 7, at 118. Ebersole and Stoelting are not alone, however. A
1983 U.N. report notes:
It is also possible to envisage United Nations involvement in an act of popular
consultation as a result of a decision by the General Assembly or the Security
Council relating to a given area or Territory which may be disputed or whose
status may be the subject of contention. In such an event, however, the agreement
of all the concerned parties would be a prerequisite for the smooth conduct of the
act of popular consultation.
United Nations Participation in Popular Consultations and Elections, DECOLONIZATION, Dec.
1983, at 3 (emphasis added).
331. For example, the Secretary-General was not beyond lobbying other countries to put
pressure on the Khmer Rouge. "I have taken advantage of the presence of many world leaders
at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro to
convey to a 6umber of them my deep concern about the problems that have arisen over
implementation of phase II [cantonment and demobilization of troops] and I have sought their
help in support of my own efforts to ensure that the timetable will be strictly adhered to by
all the Cambodian parties." Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia, supra note 276, at para. 8. However, he was committed
to following the schedule set out by UNTAC at the beginning of the mission. "[T]he question
arose of whether 13 June 1992 should be maintained as the date for implementation of phase
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Although the final exclusion of the Khmer Rouge may have led to
continued fighting in Cambodia, the other two options left to UNTAC
would probably not have succeeded. The U.N. could have ceased the
operation and withdrawn all U.N. personnel from Cambodia, but without
any international restraints, the fighting in Cambodia would probably
have escalated and the prospects for democracy lessened. 32 On the other
hand, catering to the Khmer Rouge's demands by postponing the hold-
ing of elections would certainly have created further incentives for the
Khmer Rouge, as well as the other parties, to hamper the U.N. and hold
hostage the electoral process.333 In retrospect, the decision to continue
with the elections was probably the correct one, as is borne out by the
success of the elections.
However, in support of his reasoning, Stoelting noted three reasons
why it was necessary to have the assent of all major political groups.
The first was that "the negotiations among disparate groups over the
United Nations' role encourages representation of all major parties in
the electoral process[.] ' ,334 This statement presupposes that one would
want representation by all major parties. In fact, whether or not the
Khmer Rouge should have been included in the cease-fire and elections
agreement was a matter hotly debated by the international community,
as both Vietnam and the SOC refused at first to negotiate with the
Khmer Rouge and many others were made uneasy by their illegitimate
past. Several distinguished persons advocated recognizing the SOC in
order to keep the Khmer Rouge from returning to power.335 Given the
II of the, cease-fire, given that it depends critically on the cooperation of all parties and would
not be sustainable for more than a brief period without such cooperation. After careful
consideration, I have concluded that phase 11 of the cease-fire must proceed as scheduled on
13 June." Id. at para. 13 (emphasis added).
332. "The alternatives would be either to put the process on hold until, by one means or
another, the [Khmer Rouge's] cooperation was obtained or to conclude that it was not
possible to pursue the operation under present conditions and that UNTAC should therefore
be withdrawn. The latter course is clearly unacceptable after so much has been achieved and
so many hopes raised that Cambodia will at last achieve peace and democracy." Report of the
Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 783, SCOR, para.
25, U.N. Doc. S/24800 (1992).
333. "In these circumstances, there are two possible courses of action: the first is to
suspend the operation until all parties can be persuaded to fulfill their obligations under the
Paris Agreements. The second is to pursue the process and thus demonstrate that, despite the
lack of cooperation of one party, the international community remains determined to assist the
Cambodian people in their quest for peace and stability. I am convinced that the latter
approach is the most appropriate." Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, supra note 276, at para. 19.
334. Stoelting, supra note 87, at 392.
335. Helen Jarvis, a lecturer at the University of New South Wales, wrote a statement to
the Australian government encouraging the exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from the elections
process and encouraging the recognition of the SOC. Nicole Brady, Australian Woman Brings
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Khmer Rouge's intractability during the electoral process, in hindsight,
those arguing for the complete exclusion of the Khmer Rouge were not
altogether unreasonable. Further, Stoelting's above statement presuppos-
es that every party to the negotiations will be a major party in the
electoral process. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge refused to participate,
but their nonparticipation mattered little in terms of turnout and raised
no fairness problems as the decision to boycott was their own. Second,
Stoelting notes that "acceptance by all political parties ensures that the
election monitors will be able to accomplish their task effectively." 336
This is a more valid reason and there is no doubt that the Khmer
Rouge's refusal to participate went hand in hand with its access restric-
tions on U.N. personnel and attacks on electoral personnel and polling
stations. However, it was proven that the popularity of the elections and
the bravery of U.N. personnel could overcome the Khmer Rouge's at-
tempts to hinder the holding of the elections. Finally, Stoelting notes
"since gauging public opinion in developing nations can be problematic,
evidence of support from all major political parties can indicate a broad-
ly based public desire for the United Nations' presence. 337 However,
this is not to say that the assent of most of the major political parties
cannot also constitute broadly based public consent.
Thus, the acceptance of all major political parties is not absolutely
necessary.338 The Khmer Rouge ruled largely from the barrel of a gun
and were widely unpopular. In this sense, they spoke for no one other
than themselves, and the threat they posed was military disruption of the
elections, not delegitimation through nonparticipation.339 While the latter
problem is difficult to solve, the former problem may be overcome.
Thus, the term "broad support" should be defined flexibly, without rigid
tests. The best way for the United Nations to do this would be a balanc-
Fight Against Khmer Rouge, THE AGE (Melbourne), May 5, 1993, at 19. Her statement was
signed by Peter Annear of Save the Children Fund in Phnom Penh, John Pilger, Reverend
Peter Holden of the Australian Council of Churches, Dr. John Hirshman of the Third World
Health Group, and scholars of the region - Ben Kiernan, Michael Vickery and Kelvin Rowley.
Id. Jeremy Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists which includes 42 Nobel
Prize winners, has supported a similar action. Seema Sirohi, U.S. Expert Urges Support for
Hun Sen Government, INTER PaESS SERVICE, March 17, 1989.
336. Stoelting, supra note 87, at 392.
337. Id. at 393.
338. The only other alternative is to define "major political party" in such a way as to
exclude the Khmer Rouge. However, it would be difficult to think of a plausible definition
that would not have described the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.
339. However, if the Khmer Rouge had represented a majority of the people, for
example, then its nonparticipation would have been a major problem. Although the military
threat of disruption was far from irrelevant, a more fundamental threat would be the tainted
legitimacy of any election in which a majority of the people did not participate.
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ing test. Is the popularity of elections and the commitment of the United
Nations enough to overcome the hostility of those opposed? If only one
Cambodian was opposed to the elections in Cambodia, even if he had a
gun, the U.N. would almost surely have continued its efforts. If that
hostile group was several thousand men, much like the Khmer Rouge,
the U.N. would decide to go to Cambodia, although with some unease.
However, if the hostile group were 100,000 or 200,000 men, equivalent
to all four factions combined, the U.N. would certainly not attempt to
get involved. The balancing test described above takes into account
these commonsensical judgments that make more sense than rigid tests.
C. Substantial Likelihood of Democracy
Another precondition to which some have looked is a substantial
likelihood of democracy. However, Cambodia seems to defy this stan-
dard as well. As Cambodia entered the 1990s, the likelihood that a
stable democratic government 3Q could be formed was miniscule accord-
ing to any theory of democracy formation. 4 The economy, which had
never been well-developed in the first place, took a step backward due
to the fighting and the forced agrarianization of the urban centers by the
Khmer Rouge during their four year rule. The largely agrarian economy
had little industry other than resource-stripping activities such as lumber
cutting and gem mining. It seemed unlikely that the people of Cambodia
340. There is a difference between a democracy and a stable democracy. Technically,
Cambodia is a democracy since the government in power was chosen in democratic elections
and has evinced an intention to continue governing the country through democratic means.
However, whether a country is democratic can be answered by taking a snapshot of the
political conditions in that country at an instant in time. In contrast, the term "stable democra-
cy" connotes some sort of extended time period. Although I use the term "stable democracy"
to mean any democracy that has a substantial chance of remaining democratic in the near
future, the term has no inherent definition. One noted expert on democracy has suggested a
two-turnover test, requiring that the party in power relinquish control of the government at
least two times to the victorious opposition party before one can say that a democratic system
of governance has a good chance of success. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE:
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 266-67 (1991).
341. Most theories of democracy formation fit into two categories: theories which depend
upon socioeconomic factors and theories which depend upon psychological factors. Those
relying on socioeconomic factors link democracy to prosperity. The idea is that prosperity
increases leisure time, education, free press, and other commodities which increase the
likelihood of democracy. See, e.g., SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES
OF POLITICS (1960); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Its Measurement and
Social Correlates, in POLITICS AND SOCIAL LIFE, 569 (Nelson W. Polsby et al. eds., 1963).
Theories dependent upon psychological factors argue that expectations of and acclimation to
concepts of democracy are important. Thus, they emphasize prior experience with democracy.
They also look to the diversity level of a society to see if the people are accustomed to
openly airing dissension or solving problems through compromise. See, e.g., ROBERT A.
DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961); VALDIMER
0. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1961).
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had achieved the standard of living necessary to provide them the sur-
plus leisure time and income necessary to educate themselves about and
participate in democratic processes. Indeed, to make matters worse,
almost everyone with the technical, professional, and political skills
necessary to bring economic improvement to Cambodia had been killed
by the Khmer Rouge or had fled to other countries.
Furthermore, with one brief exception,342 the Cambodian people had
never experienced any sort of truly democratic government. Of the four
major Cambodian factions, none had any experience with democracy.
Each of the factions had controlled the country at one time or another
and all had used nondemocratic or sham-democratic3" forms of gover-
nance. Thus, it was more likely that the Cambodian leaders would
subvert any democratic processes for their own purposes than abide by
the will of the people. Even if the elites did not destroy the democratic
process, there was no way to predict whether the Cambodian people
would participate in elections in a meaningful and useful manner.'
In fact, armed conflict had long been the standard means of resolv-
ing disputes in Cambodia. There had been over twenty years of civil
war, only interrupted by four years of "peace" filled with terror and
mass murder. 3 6 It is estimated that in the latter period the Khmer Rouge
killed at least one million persons out of a population of approximately
six to eight million.347 Although Vietnam had withdrawn all of its troops
342. The elections held in 1955 after Cambodia gained its independence from the French
were probably free and fair under the standards of international law. CAMBODIA, supra note
14, at 28-29.
343. It is true, however, that all the factions currently support some sort of economic and
political liberalization, at least in word.
344. By "sham-democratic," I mean a government that uses democratic rhetoric but does
not allow its citizens true political choice in their governance.
345. Early in UNTAC's time in Cambodia, even the Secretary-General was guarded in
his assessment of the attitudes of the Cambodian people towards elections. "After two decades
of fighting and international isolation, many Cambodians are little aware of the international
community's efforts to assist their country. Many are skeptical about the applicability in
Cambodia of basic concepts of human rights, including free and fair elections and multiparty
political campaigning." Second Progress Report, supra note 210, at para. 59.
346. Although the well-publicized activities of the Khmer Rouge during their reign are
often referred to as "genocide," that is not technically correct. "Genocide" has traditionally
referred to situations in which persons of one race or nationality have systematically killed
persons of another race or nationality. If genocide merely denoted causing death on a massive
scale, most major wars would be genocidal. The actions of the Khmer Rouge are therefore
genocide when committed against ethnic Vietnamese, but are "mass murders" when commit-
ted against ethnic Cambodians.
347. The estimates of the numbers of those murdered vary greatly. The People's Repub-
lic of Kampuchea, the Cambodian government installed by the Vietnamese after they defeated
the Khmer Rouge, estimated three million dead. CAMBODIA, supra note 14, at 51. The U.S.
Department of State determined that 1.2 million persons had been killed. Id. The Khmer
Rouge admit to between 800,000 and 1 million deaths during their rule. Id. The total popula-
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and the various Cambodian factions had agreed to a cease-fire and
elections, the fact remained that animosity ran high among the four
competing Cambodian parties and each of the factions was heavily
armed.
It is clear that lack of a democratic tradition or low likelihood of
democracy formation should not be dispositive in deciding whether the
U.N. should become involved in elections.' Other factors, such as the
support for elections within the country, the commitment of the United
Nations, and the technical expertise of the way in which the electoral
process is conducted are relevant.
D. Cost of the Mission
Similarly, although the cost of an operation has been cited as an
important factor in determining whether to mount a mission, it should
not be dispositive. The Cambodian operation is likely to be the most
expensive U.N. operation ever.3 9 This would seem to mitigate against
going ahead with the mission, especially in light of the low likelihood
of holding free and fair elections and creating a stable democracy.
However, the actual results have been extremely heartening - the hold-
ing of free and fair elections and the creation of a stable and functioning
government that has stated its support of continued democracy. These
positive results can be attributed to the support for elections among the
populace, the commitment of the United Nations, and technical expertise
that was applied to the conducting of the electoral process.35
CONCLUSION
There are two lessons that can be learned from the way in which the
Cambodian elections were conducted a.35 The first lesson of the Cambo-
tion of Cambodia at the time of the Khmer Rouge takeover in April 1975 can also only be
estimated since the last census occurred in 1962. It was estimated at 7.1 million in 1972. Id.
348. Note that I have defined likelihood of democracy in a broad manner that encom-
passes Ebersole's categories of administrative capacity of existing electoral institutions and
security factors. See Ebersole, supra note 7, at 118.
349. The Cambodian mission will cost an estimated $1.5-$2.0 billion, involved over
16,000 personnel, and lasted 1 years. By comparison, the 1989 Namibia mission, considered
one of the most expensive and intrusive, cost $373 million, involved 7,900 personnel at its
peak, and lasted one year. Namibia: Independence at Last, U.N. CHioN., June 1990, at 4.
350. Perhaps it is not that we have been overestimating the importance of factors such as
likelihood of democracy and cost, but that we have not given enough credence to the wide-
spread yearning for individual or internal self-determination and the commitment of the
United Nations to this goal.
351. There are some administrative lessons to be learned from Cambodia that will not be
discussed in detail. For example, most U.N. personnel were overpaid (most received a $145
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dian elections is that neutrality can be a double-edged sword, especially
when one is running an election in addition to observing it. On the one
hand, neutrality gives an organization the trust necessary to mediate in a
conflict-ridden situation such as Cambodia. It is the United Nations'
neutrality that helps to ensure that the involved parties feel safe in
abiding by the terms of the agreement. The loss of that neutrality means
the loss of cooperation from the involved parties. However, following
strict neutrality also means that one's actions are severely limited.
UNTAC, in many cases, could not attempt to prosecute the crimes of
the SOC to a greater extent for fear that this would make it prejudiced
in the eyes of the SOC. The experience of the U.N. in Cambodia pro-
vides some support for the idea that strict neutrality may be desirable
overall, even when following its strictures may detrimentally affect the
conduct of the elections. Many times, UNTAC's response to SOC
coercion of opposition parties could not take the form of harsh mea-
sures; UNTAC feared losing the cooperation of the SOC and CPP and
undermining the entire electoral process.
The other lesson to be learned is that the intrusiveness of UNTAC's
involvement in the process could be to the benefit of free and fair
elections. Those aspects of the elections completely under UNTAC
control were handled well. The registration of voters was a great suc-
cess. Ninety-six percent of all eligible voters registered in a country with
difficult to reach areas, a political group which controlled a substantial
part of the population and actively opposed UNTAC, and with almost
no foundation for democracy. Enough parties registered to provide the
people a real choice without causing confusion. Although there were
some problems in campaigning, UNTAC's own attempts to educate the
people were largely successful, despite the obstructionist efforts of the
Khmer Rouge. Further, although the SOC was not forthcoming with its
media, UNTAC's own media provided a channel of access, especially to
smaller parties without resources. Finally, there is little doubt about the
impartiality of UNTAC, the reich of the polling stations and the fairness
of the ballot counting run by UNTAC.
daily hardship allowance on top of their salaries). Furthermore, some personnel behaved in an
abominable manner, as in the case of the Bulgarians, see Lindsay Murdoch, UN, Cambodia
Disgraced by Unruly Peace-Keepers, THE AGE (Melbourne), Sept. 20, 1993, at 8, while
others were corrupt, as in the case where U.N. vehicles allegedly were sold to Cambodians
and then listed as a loss, see Peter Hillmore, British Officer Blows Whistle on UN Corruption,
OBSERVER, August 29, 1993, available in NEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File. However, this
paper takes it for granted that these types of problems are widely recognized and have been
discussed before. This paper's purpose is to study the process of bringing participatory rights
to the host country and thus administrative improvements not directly affecting that goal are
beyond its scope.
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This lesson is at once commonsensical and troubling. That is, the
more involved the United Nations is and the greater its capabilities, the
more successful the mission. The more time spent, the more money
spent, the greater the dedication of the volunteers, the greater the United
Nations' control over the process, and the greater the United Nations
actual leverage over the parties, the more successful the United Nations.
However, all of this is troubling because it raises the question of how
much is too much? At some point, the price will become too great.
UNTAC is estimated to cost between $1.5 and $2.0 billion, with another
$880 million in reconstruction aid promised. The price of UNTAC is
greater than the yearly G.N.P. of Cambodia,352 and some nations are
already falling behind on their U.N. payments. Further, how much
control can the United Nations exercise before it is clearly violating
Charter Article 2(7)? Electoral observation missions might become
methods of intervention for the major powers and, at the very least, will
provide convenient examples to point to when smaller nations cry
imperialism. Apparently, the United Nations will have to continue to
tread carefully, as it has already done, as it continues similar operations
in the Western Sahara, Bosnia, and Somalia and discusses operations for
Angola and Afghanistan.
The final analysis is that the elections were a success. Although the
elections were not unequivocally free and fair, they did allow the popu-
lace to express its will to an amazing extent given the context. However,
it would be unfair to the Cambodian people to call the elections free and
fair and then relegate Cambodia to the international backwater to which
it was confined before it became a proxy in the Cold War. It would also
trivialize, for example, the deaths of forty six FUNCINPEC electoral
workers. The Cambodian elections were substantially free and fair,
meaning the will of the people was expressed in many respects, but not
so in all respects. There is still some doubt as to the continued ability of
the country to govern itself in a democratic manner. Although UNTAC
is to be commended, the world should continue to monitor closely the
situation in Cambodia before it can declare victory.
352. Making conservative estimates of a population of 8 million persons and a per capita
G.N.P. of $200/year results in an annual G.N.P. of $1.6 billion.
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